


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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

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Near East & South Asia

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20 October 1994

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

West's Pressure on Arabs Criticized

94AA0126B Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 17 Sep 94 p 3

[FBIS Translated Text] Under the leadership of the United States, the Western countries have become accustomed to exerting numerous pressures on any country that does not comply with their wishes or act according to their demands, conditions, and interests. The examples are numerous of this Western policy that is extremely far from legality, logic, and international agreements.

These countries are now pouring out all their pressures on the Arab world to obligate it to accept the conditions of the Israeli peace in order to protect Western interests in this region. These pressures manifest themselves by harassing the countries of the Arab world in the World Bank by convincing it to stop extending any assistance, or through trade, tourism, and numerous other devices, including the launching of media campaigns against those countries.

Israel participates in this campaign of pressures because those countries are allies of Israel and act in the interest of Israel.

Recently the Israeli prime minister conducted a fierce campaign against Syria and considered its firm, honest position to be a stumbling block in bringing about a just peace in this area.

He conducted a campaign against the Palestinian people and the Palestinian authority and threatened that his government would draw its conclusions from what is taking place and take the appropriate measures. He conducted campaigns against Iraq, Iran, and Libya because these countries refuse to conduct any discussion with Israel. The foreign minister, Shim'on Peres, participated in this campaign.

The campaign is being conducted to force the Arab world to make concessions. Concessions are also to be made to Israel under the banner of achieving peace and stability in the region.

What Rabin and his cabinet want is acceptance by the Arabs of the Israeli conditions and proposals. They want the Arabs to be in their service and under their control and hegemony; so that the Arabs will act as guardians of the interests of Israel and implement what orders and resolutions it desires.

But in our opinion, these pressures will only increase the determination and stubbornness of the honest Arabs and will increase their national Arab feeling of kinship. They will completely reject this blackmailing device and these pressures. If the Arabs were destined to unite, then these pressures will disappear without a trace. They will be nothing more than mere soap bubbles.

The application of such pressures does not indicate that the world is moving toward stability and security. It does not give any impression that there is support for the victim and a sincere attitude to international justice. However, it is these pressures themselves that are obstructing the peace march and taking it farther away from its sound and correct path.

If the countries of the Western world had wanted to achieve security and stability in the region, then it would be incumbent upon them to keep to international legality and force Israel to apply and implement it through the full and comprehensive withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967, as well as to implement all international resolutions issued by the United Nations.

It will be of no benefit if the application of those pressures were to continue. We would like to affirm here that the Arab world, especially its powerful countries, will never submit to those pressures. They will not abandon their firm position, and they will not permit these pressures to prejudice their sovereignty and independence.

We would frankly like to say here that understanding, mutual respect, and the implementation of international legality are far preferable to pressure and harassing tactics. We also say it so that these pressures will cease because they will not make us abandon our positions and just demands. They themselves are the only obstacle to achieving a just peace and should only be applied against whoever violates international legality and does not abide by it. It should not be applied against those possessing legitimate rights and just, sound demands.

George Habash on PA Issues

94AA0120A Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 27 Aug 94 pp 5-11

[Interview with PFLP Secretary General Habash; place and date not given—first two paragraphs are AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The painful and difficult circumstances endured by our Palestinian people in the autonomous areas and the other areas of the West Bank, and even in the diaspora, and which threaten our national destiny as a people, a territory, and a cause, make it necessary for us at AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI to open our pages to all Palestinian views in order for there to be interaction that might lead to something good, in the general interests of the Palestinian people.

Thus AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI has taken the initiative to conduct political dialogues on current Palestinian topics with numerous Palestinian leaders, both those who support the peace process and those who oppose it. In this connection, AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI conducted the following interview with our brother George Habash, the secretary general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP].

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Many supporters of the peace process confront the opposition with the question: What is your alternative to what is going on? How does Dr. George Habash, as the secretary general of the PFLP, and prominent figure in the course of the Palestinian revolution since its beginnings, view the alternative to the existing Palestinian and Arab situation?

[Habash] Our Palestinian people and its national movement, over the long decades of struggle and tremendous sacrifices, on the basis of its fixed goals and the time-tested rights, defined its clear option, which is: struggle, and more struggle, and more struggle, in order to win its complete and undiminished freedom and independence.

The situation has never before been presented in the hegemonistic fashion in which the collapsing leadership is presenting it to us today. Our people and our nation have never had to balance or weigh our country, truth, freedom, and expulsion of the occupiers, versus betraying the country, our rights, and the recognition of the occupiers' right to exist on our land, for us to debase ourselves to them, to serve their interests, and defend their security.

Therefore, when we are asked what the alternative is, we say that the alternative is the path ordained and defined by thousands of martyrs: adherence to our national and pan-Arab rights, adherence to our patriotic liberationist program, the right of return, self-determination, and an independent state with its capital in Jerusalem. Our alternative is struggle and more struggle, to expell the occupiers and sweep their settlements from our land. Whoever dreams that there is any other alternative—by going along with the occupiers and their demands—will only sink into the quicksand of treason, whether he wants to or not.

It would have been possible to understand this matter had it been presented in a radically different format, such as "The methods of our work and mission have plenty of problems, shortcomings, and errors, which have led them to continuous predicaments and crises. So come and let us review our sins and errors, so that we may be worthy of leading this great and valiant people; come, let us review our instruments of political, organizational, militant, military, financial, national, and global action. How can we maintain a more effective power of resistance to our enemy, and of faster progress toward our stated goals?"

If this matter had been presented to us that way, at the time, it would have initiated a wide-ranging debate. But for the leadership to go and embrace Rabin and Peres, and give them everything they were unable to get by fire and violence over the course of all these wars; for the leadership to go from being a revolutionary command to being traitors and hirelings, and bulwarks to protect the occupiers and their settlements, and the shameful neglect of the land, and rights, the costly sacrifices, and the transformation of our combatant people, forgotten by

the whole world, into mere servants of the Israeli authorities—we absolutely, totally reject that, and will oppose this perversion, which is aimed at the consciousness of our people and our nation.

The degree of degradation and pleading to the enemy that the collapsing leadership has attained, and its readiness to fight our people and its militant forces defending its security and the security of its settlements and its soldiers residing on our land—this is a cause for regret, and provokes all our feelings of patriotic hatred.

What has brought us to this pass was absolutely not our rejection and opposition to the Zionist plan or our nihilism, as alleged by the signatories of the limited administrative autonomy under the occupiers' domination. What put us in this situation was the destructive path followed by the executive leadership over the course of years and years of its leadership and dominance over the PLO's committees and institutions, with its isolation, bureaucracy, corruption, cliquishness, opportunistic fluctuations, its harming of values and ethics, purging the organization and revolutionary forces of elements of strength, and policy of falling into the arms of Arab reactionaries and becoming subject to them, harming relations between the Arab masses and their liberation forces, tearing apart national unity, harming democracy, and many other erroneous policies that have led to the virtual hollowing out and abuse of our people. The natural consequence was the major upset in the balance with our enemy, locally and regionally, and the overwhelming superiority it enjoys in that balance, in addition to the weakness of the Arab camp, and the dispersion and dissolution of democratic forces and their inability to rein in and stop the bureaucratic leadership.

All this has helped to bring about the current state of collapse. It would be very wrong to think that recognizing Israel and bargaining with it will put an end to its plan. Or for anyone to imagine that the current accords will put an end to its appetite for occupation and hostility, its looting of all our nation's resources, and striking at our aspirations for progress, unity, and advancement.

For all these reasons, and others, our alternative is resistance and rejection of the Zionist plan, and opposition to it, building the conditions for resistance to it, in nationalist and pan-Arab terms, unifying the efforts of all our patriotic forces in their various factions, in one unified front.

We say to the world: If you really are speaking of a serious and actual peace, then why don't you impose obedience to UN resolutions—in whose name you speak—on the hostile and occupying Israeli enemy? It was in the UN's name that you destroyed Iraq, and in which you are blockading Libya. It is the minimum that would secure our people a fraction of its rights—we do not say all these rights. The vast majority of the world has recognized the national rights of our people. Many of the resolutions of the UN and the Security Council

clearly stipulate the necessity of a total and comprehensive withdrawal from the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and they assert the illegitimacy of the settlements. They recognize the right of our people to establish its independent state. So why are these resolutions not enforced?

Why do the United States and the rest of the imperialist European countries side with the Israeli entity, providing it with all the elements of strength at the same time it commits one massacre after another against our defenseless people in Palestine and Lebanon? Why does the United States fume with rage threatening democratic Korea to allow it to inspect its nuclear installations, while not saying a word about Israel's stockpile of weapons of mass destruction? At the same time it hunts down any country that might have supplied Syria with a few armaments. And it calls Syria terrorist. Is there any terrorism greater than that of the Israeli entity—the murderer of women, children, and old men? So as long as the Oslo-Cairo people have chosen their shameful path, let them leave the question of an alternative aside—it is no longer an issue relevant to them. We and our people know very well what we want—let them know that we will not be in the trench in which they stand. Before us is the future, which will tighten the noose around their necks.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] What is your assessment of Jordan's rapid progress regarding the opening of crossing points, contacts, and the possible linking of the electrical grid with Israel? Does this serve the necessity, praised by some, of establishing comprehensive peace?

[Habash] The state of collapse that has befallen the Jordanian track is no less catastrophic and dangerous than the Oslo breakthrough itself, and before that the treasonous Camp David accords. What is happening in Jordan contradicts the statements and claims that accompanied the invitation to the Madrid conference, to which we declared our principled and total rejection at the time. The course of events clearly says that the Palestinian and Jordanian sides have not even committed to the fragile base on whose basis they justified their entry into the Madrid option. We all recall the statements on a just and lasting peace and adherence to Resolutions 242 and 338, land for peace, the matter of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands, the topic of Jerusalem, the settlements, Arab coordination, and so on. In practice it was all exactly the opposite. The Palestinian and Jordanian fronts were quick to collapse, allowing the Israeli entity to divide the Arab delegations and overpower them one at a time, isolating them in the end, imposing its own terms, without considering the Arabs' minimum national or pan-Arab interests. Hence the resounding, hegemonistic collapse. The gates were flung wide open to the tentacles of the Israeli octopus, as if there had never been any problem between our people and nation, and the fascist, racist occupation that plundered our land, dispersed millions of people, and threatened the present and future of all our nation's hopes and aspirations.

The facts of these events show that what happened and what is still happening in the name of national interests, and the name of realism, and on the pretext of dealing with new factors, imagining that these are victories won by the collapsing leaders, provoke only sorrow and contempt. Is this the extent of the disdain of our history and the minds of our masses, and of their incalculable sacrifices? Was it for these humiliating accords that our nation fought for decades and decades, losing hundreds of thousands of martyrs?

The reality of the situation exposes the fact that all the talk of a just and comprehensive peace is just empty chatter. The truth is that the accords are nothing but a total surrender to the conditions and will of Israel.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] The economic situation in the Palestinian territories is still going from bad to worse. Unemployment is everywhere, and the countries giving aid are enforcing debilitating conditions. How do you view the objectives of the economic pressures on the Palestinian people in the occupied territories?

[Habash] The economic pressure being put on our Palestinian people by Israeli occupation in the occupied homeland has never let up for a single day. In this particular period it has taken on graver and crueler dimensions, and the basic objective of this meticulous policy is for the Palestinian masses to remain under the burden of economic need; to push them ever farther from thinking of patriotic attacks. Furthermore, economic pressure is an extremely dangerous weapon with which to block the path of economic development and to shackle our national economy, to render it subservient and dependent upon the Israeli economic system and its needs. At the same time, it is an instrument to snatch yet more concessions from the self-rule authority, and to keep us constantly at the mercy of the occupiers, the mercy of the International Monetary Fund, and the conditions of aid-granting countries biased towards Israel regarding basic issues left abandoned according to the accord's provisions for the coming negotiating phases, such as the question of Jerusalem, the settlements, sovereignty, and other things.

The economic conditions and biases laid down by the shameful Oslo and Cairo agreements are the logical result of the option the influential Palestinian leadership chose: collapse. For those who accepted concessions that gave away the national and pan-Arab rights of our people and our nation, it is only natural that they would also accept no less damaging concessions on the economic front.

Life has been quick to prove—with a speed even the accord-makers themselves did not expect—that all the rosy promises they bestowed so liberally, with the encouragement of their masters—on economic luxury and ease, that the autonomous regions would become the Hong Kong of the Middle East—were just dreams and deceptions. The imperialist-Zionist-exterminationist plan will give 'Arafat's authority only enough power to

keep it subservient, a hostage in the service of this plan. The masses of the Palestinian people, on the other hand, have begun to expose, and speedily, the danger of the abyss into which the Oslo people are rushing, and that a solution to the economic and social puzzles and problems is impossible as long as the occupation rests on the hearts of our people and on our land, plundering and oppressing wherever it turns.

It is impossible for there to be true economic independence and rights based on the people's interests, as long as the homeland is occupied, as long as the occupiers do exactly as they please. There is no possibility of economic independence without political independence, and political independence is not possible without economic independence.

The indications are, the actual interpretation of the administrative autonomy accords, confirm that the struggle is still very much ongoing. Day after day, 'Arafat's authority finds no alternative to embracing the occupation, and linking itself more and more with the occupiers, under the pressure of the restrictions with which the Zionists still bind him, politically, economically, and in security terms.

The solution being offered is not a solution leading to peace; it is a solution that imposes surrender in accordance with the occupiers' interests, from A to Z. Thus it is a fleeting, temporary "peace"; the basis and roots of the struggle have not been addressed. Our people will not accept this, whether the Oslo signatories like it or not. This is the logic of things and the nature of things.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Israel is still delaying the implementation of the Cairo Agreement, and is still besieging Yasir 'Arafat in Gaza. It seems, in general, that Israel is making plans that have nothing to do with autonomy or expanding it through the rest of the West Bank. What is your assessment of the Cairo Agreement three months after it was signed?

[Habash] We have said from the very beginning that the participation of 'Arafat's leadership in the Madrid process would never lead to anything but getting Israel what it wanted. What brought about this course of the declaration of principles in Oslo and the letters of recognition, and the following interpretation of the Cairo declaration of principles, subsequently did not deviate from the general formula of the spirit of obedience to shameful Israeli conditions in its national, historical, and humanitarian dimensions. You have 'Arafat's own statements to the Israeli press when he said he was plagued by frustration. He confirmed Israel's shameful practices and the domination he was experiencing at the hands of Rabin's government.

For this reason I believe that Israel is not besieging 'Arafat in Gaza—it is 'Arafat himself who has put himself in the Israelis' cage, and contented himself with being under the command of the occupation authorities, and so 'Arafat must realize that he has lost his standing

as a figure and as the commander of the Palestinian revolution. He has become a mere mayor or town administrator, under the command of the occupation authorities—nothing more. Was 'Arafat expecting any more than that, after losing all his effective, primary weaponry: the intifadah, national unity, Arab coordination, and the decrees of the United Nations?

As to Israel's view of the concept of autonomy, it has not changed. It is based on the principle of transferring the burdens of administrative matters and local security on to 'Arafat's leadership, while Israel retains its control over land, water, crossing points, security, and foreign policy. So Israel will continue to shift some administrative powers in the West Bank to the autonomy authorities, with the objective of burying them in more obstacles for which it has no further use in light of the Oslo-Cairo accord. At the same time, Israel can see the state of political, financial, and administrative bankruptcy that 'Arafat's leadership suffers from. This explains some of the Israeli aims and the process of what is called the early transfer of powers to the autonomous authorities, bringing 'Arafat and his people to a state of early impotence and bankruptcy, so that Palestinians will then long for the era of occupation. Herein lies the danger and the tragedy that the agreement—which has now been in the implementation phase for more than three months—has shown about the truth about partial solutions. The autonomous areas have become segregated, groaning under the weight of hunger, poverty, and want, living together on the crumbs of foreign aid, most of which goes to provide the necessities for the local security people and 'Arafat's entourage.

In this way, 'Arafat has set the Palestinian cause back five decades, so that the Palestinian issue is no longer a cause for liberating a nation and restoring a people dispersed by Zionist gangs. It has been brought down for a handful of cash and material aid, just enough to secure 'Arafat's leadership at the pinnacle of the autonomous authority, in exchange for the continued existence of the occupation and settlements on the soil of Palestine.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] The issue of the detainees is still in Israel's hands. It has imposed the notorious document of custody, proceeded randomly with those it has freed, and mistreated those it has detained. How do you assess the role of the Palestinian negotiators as relates to the detainees? How do you view the possibilities of retraining those who have been released?

[Habash] The Palestinian negotiators' work on the issue of the prisoners has not gone beyond the spirit of 'Arafat's leadership with all the national issues and rights. This is a basis which focuses on the concept of neglect and surrender to Israel's shameful conditions. Among these issues is the prisoner issue, which was isolated by the Cairo accord, decreeing that our fighters and prisoners be deprived of their bitter struggle and noble history, with the aim of reaping some narrow factionalist gains, in a desperate attempt to convince

some of our people of the advantages of the accord, and to make 'Arafat appear more appealing to the masses.

The stand of 'Arafat's leadership on the prisoner issue has been shameful, insulting, and offensive, and has aroused feelings of disgust. It should have stuck by the demand for the unconditional release of all detainees. When 'Arafat agreed to enter Gaza given the presence of thousands of detainees in Israeli prisons, that compounded the tragedy; later on, he accepted the barter of prisoners for agents, on Israeli terms, bargaining over those who had offered their lives and youth for the freedom of our nation, and those who had sold the nation and consented to be enemy agents. Could there be anything more brazen, shameful, and treasonous to morals and honor?

As to the question of training the detainees—this is a major national duty for which all Palestinian political forces, national institutions, and public figures are responsible. I would like to reaffirm here our prisoners' priority and legal claim when it comes to employment in our institutions, as they will be the most worthy, after the appropriate training for them. Their human and social needs must be met, as part of the debt we all owe to these heroes.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] The issue of return has been shrunk by hundreds or several thousands, while hundreds of deportees are still where they were, and the issue of the emigrants and refugees has gone nowhere. What is your vision of how Palestinian negotiators should deal with these issues?

[Habash] As I have said above, the mentality of 'Arafat's leadership, and his negotiators, is the same on all subjects. It has not changed with regard to land, sovereignty, settlements, Jerusalem, or the issues of emigrants, refugees, and deportees. It is a contemptuous, reckless mentality, ignoring the safeguarding of rights, nor does it see the issue as an integrated whole. With the issue of the emigrants, refugees, and deportees, 'Arafat's leadership has not taken into consideration the overwhelming historical importance of the historical, geographic, and spiritual unity of the Palestinian people. It has dealt with that issue with the view that the Palestinian people are scattered population groups spread around in Palestine and outside it.

Thus it has seen the return of several thousands of our people to the autonomous areas as an important achievement, and began to extol it and portray it as a historic event and the beginning of the implementation of our right of return. The facts are, however, the exact opposite. The return of several thousand was due to the needs of the autonomy—specifically, the difficulty associated with building a police force, in addition to other administrative agencies attached to 'Arafat's leadership.

Is what has occurred, and what might occur, thanks to 'Arafat's vision and his accord, the beginning of our right of return, and an actual solution to the problem of the

refugees and emigrants? My answer is no. Why? Because the Oslo-Cairo accord and the Madrid conditions do not include the right of return. In fact, it eliminated this right, which is supported by UN resolutions. The agreements of the emigrant and refugee issue were transformed from a national issue with strategic dimensions in the struggle with the enemy, in the present and future, into a regional and global issue whose solutions are being perpetrated on the basis of settlement, emigration, and resettlement and compensation outside Palestine. The committees set up by the Madrid conference and the Oslo-Cairo accord were not intended to study the 60 percent of Palestinians outside Palestine—they were set up to perpetuate the partition, and deny the people outside the soil of their country, and concentrate on finding financial and political solutions for the countries hosting Palestinian refugees.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Jerusalem: despite the fact that the topic has been postponed, Rabin is handling it with a "status quo" policy. This has obviously manifested itself in his granting King Husayn precedence in the custody of the holy places. How do you see the future of Jerusalem? How do you assess the Palestinian-Jordanian dispute over Jerusalem?

[Habash] Jerusalem and the other territories occupied in 1967 are, according to the provisions of the Oslo accord, considered to be "disputed territories," not occupied territories as described by the UN resolutions. Thus precedence in ruling and administering Jerusalem and other cities goes to the occupation forces and not the 'Arafat leadership, which squandered the rights of the Palestinian people to their land and holy places. This is the bitter truth of the Oslo accord, which was the reason for our rejection of the accord and our insistence on opposing and defeating it. Rabin has forbidden 'Arafat from mentioning Jerusalem as the capital of the state of Palestine, or as being occupied territory. He has only allowed him to say that he wants to pray in Jerusalem. At the same time Rabin has not ceased reaffirming, morning and night, that united Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel. In the meantime, Rabin is keeping the door barely ajar as regards the Muslim and Christian holy places, so that they may be on the negotiating table with all parties having some link to Jerusalem, with the aim of snatching or trading them. This is what happened in the Washington accord signed by Rabin and King Husayn. One of the provisions gave the Jordanian king administrative custody of the Muslim holy places, with the aim of dispensing with the issue of Jerusalem, and provoking contradictions between the autonomous authority and the Jordanian regime. In any case, this is a contradiction that will serve the occupiers more and more, and will lend the occupiers more prestige. We cannot rule out that the Rabin government will not try to stir up the same problem between the Eastern and Western churches, when it comes to religious custody over the Christian holy places.

We see Jerusalem and the question of Jerusalem as religious custody over the Christian holy places. The history and ancient sites are the property of the Palestinian people alone, and they have the right to deal with them on the principle that religion is God's and the land belongs to its owners. Thus it is the duty of all devotees to look to Jerusalem in a comprehensive way and save its territory, holy places, and residents from the defilement and desecration of occupying forces' actions.

I regret to say that whoever waits for a gift or donation from a usurping occupier, will not last; we had hoped that all would safeguard Jerusalem and its holy places in a special place in their hearts, or advance and liberate Jerusalem and its holy places from the occupiers' atrocities, rather than cry out for the usurping occupiers' gifts and payments. Whoever wants to have his say about the holy places must be one of their liberators, like 'Umar Ibn-al-Khattab and Saladin. Only then will the Palestinian people take the keys to Jerusalem for their own; for the rest, Jerusalem belongs to its people, not to those who lost it or squandered away any rights or authority over it.

As to the Palestinian-Jordanian dispute, or, more precisely, the dispute between the autonomous authority and the King of Jordan, this is a dispute arising from a competition over serving the good of the occupiers, with each side pleading for legitimacy and administrative sovereignty over occupied land and the holy places under occupation.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Where do the dissident Palestinian factions stand, particularly after the failure of the ten factions' experiment? And how can the opposition correct the Palestinian negotiating course?

[Habash] Let me explain my understanding of the issue of the Palestinian opposition, because some of the opinions I hear or read need to be corrected or amended. Some people have a superficial and hasty view of the opposition, as if it were a simple issue.

What happened in the contemporary Palestinian national movement was a large and dangerous earthquake, which practically meant that the revision of matters and reorganization of the ranks needed time in order for the situation to be stable and normal. The collapse of the influential leadership of the PLO, its abandonment of the national, liberationist program, and its blows at the bases of the Palestinian struggle, and its rending of the unity of the people and state of confusion resulting within the PLO, in its committees and institutions, and its charter, as it represents the fundamental identity of the Palestinian people... All of this created a state of intensely complex movement, which for practical purposes meant that the confrontation of challenges would not require a mere superficial reorganization; the confrontation and response to the challenges of the era calls for something greater, more profound, more comprehensive, and must review from within every faction opposing the Oslo-Cairo option, that the course of this review might be clear and sufficient. It might be clear in terms of the political

goal and general political slogan, but it must be clear in terms of the tactic that the opposition forces and factions must employ, in the sense that the mass organizational framework, its structure, and its instruments for action must conform to the forces, and represent them, especially as the agreement of these forces to oppose the exterminationist plans in the general sense does not mean that there are no conflicts or issues among them, in the past and still to come.

So the process of building the national opposition needs sufficient time and effort in order for issues to mature and to define limits and for the political, intellectual, and organizational movement to reach a point of relative stability. These were all violently shaken by the autonomy accords and the destruction of the unity of the PLO and the Palestinian national movement. We have before us a building process that requires certain conditions and tools, but in the final analysis there is no room and no option for any serious force committed to combating the exterminationist autonomy plan, other than advancing along the road of unity among all other dissident forces, no matter how much their interpretations and philosophical creeds differ.

Our foe faces us with unified power, and we must confront it with unified power, such as the national forces and persons of various directions—the nationalist, leftist, and Islamic.

Our efforts to unify the opposition will not cease. We will never weary of the task. We will debate with everyone, without exception, in order to arrive at the right time and right formula for unifying all our efforts, and direct them into achieving our national liberationist program, without any restraint on the freedom of any side to express opinions or beliefs that differ from the others.

In the end, all the opposition forces are unanimous in saying that the Oslo-Cairo accord is exterminationist and betrays our national objectives and interests, and that the only solution is the expulsion of the occupiers, soliders and settlements; that Jerusalem is the capital of the state of Palestine; that there are no alternatives to freedom, independence, and adherence to the intifadah as a national and popular option and to mass economic struggle; that there is the need to link the national and pan-Arab dimensions. Are these not enough for our unified efforts and energies to achieve? Aren't all these points more important than existing disputes or those that might come up?

As to the other part of the problem, I believe that it is not the opposition's mission to correct the course, as the question says. We set out as one group as an opposition force on the basis of rejecting the current course, seeing it as being one based on a contradiction of our minimum national and pan-Arab rights. Not only that, we gave the occupiers more than they ever dreamed of.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] You have undertaken steps toward unification with the Democratic Front [DFLP]. How far has this dialogue gotten? What is the objective of these steps?

[Habash] The dialogues with our comrades in the DFLP are to mature and create the conditions and beginnings of an ongoing Front union, and have not stopped. From the beginning, we said that our success together in achieving unity must not be hasty, and that we must not see it as a tactical goal but as a strategic plan and option. This requires deliberation, and avoidance of falling prey to the pressure of the moment, and the emotions that go along with it, without ignoring the merits of the era, of course.

So we see in our unity one response to the challenge of the times, and therefore we must be determined to make this process possible, so that we do not make errors that could be fatal to the new experiment before it begins to grow.

Also, our experiences and the experience of others have taught us that unity, in order to be solid, must rely upon the masses, and the democratic, grassroots will, and must not be limited to upper-level decisions, made by committees and handed down as orders to our party bases. We are vibrant parties with our history, experience, and differences. We deal with thousands of members and hundreds of thousands of friends, who do not function like robots. Given that, we must go back to them, and that is what we have done in a poll we took among our party base, which expressed its enthusiasm and clear conviction for this plan. The will of the party base is a significant force for the success of the unity-oriented course. In addition, there are issues that require dialogue and discussion to clarify the particulars of the conflict and methods of dealing with them, but on the basis of faith and conviction in the unity issue. Along with the indispensable dialogue and debate process, we are taking other specific steps for unity, such as unifying the democratic framework, among the masses and functional agencies and institutions. Everyone is aware that the unification process has its problems and dilemmas, which must be dealt with flexibly and calmly, with no speeches or noise. This is what we are doing, seriously and responsibly.

The objectives of the move toward unity are rooted in our conviction in unity as an inevitable option and weapon to serve the needs of our national struggle. We have recorded this very precisely, in the clarity of our central documents, "The Political Program and the Internal System," and other documents and writings.

National unity is in general a strong popular demand and major, decisive weapon in confronting our national enemy. Why is it that we speak of democratic forces working together in the program and the organizational, intellectual, and class structure. We have a national, liberationist, social, democratic program, and our confidence in the unity of all democratic Palestinian forces—including all democratic and progressive persons—has not and will not be shaken.

One of the conditions for success for confronting these times is the creation of the democratic alternative, and that is impossible if the democratic forces remain

scattered and dispersed. We have no choice but to unify, and it is in this framework that steps are being taken between us and our comrades in the DFLP.

The unity of the democratic forces greatly multiply our efforts and energies, and strengthen hope in victory, and represent a factor that concentrates and focuses the masses. We are preparing ourselves to plunge into a long and bitter struggle against a pitiless enemy.

To achieve the sought-after goal in this regard, we need the aid and support of our masses and our friends on an ongoing basis.

Deal With Abu-al-'Abbas Alleged

94WR0258A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
4 Sep 94 pp 22-24

[FBIS Translated Text] Ironically, or perhaps coincidentally, as French intelligence was pursuing the symbol of revolutionary violence in the last quarter of this century, Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez, alias Carlos, and setting a trap for him in Khartoum, sources say that on the other side of the African continent a strange reconciliation was taking place, preceded by bargaining and by marathon, exhausting, and lengthy negotiations. One of the parties was the well-known Palestinian official Muhammad 'Abbas (Abu-al-'Abbas); the other was the American intelligence agency, the CIA.

There is no relation between Carlos and Abu-al-'Abbas, although both were born in more or less the same period. Carlos was born in Caracas in 1959; Abu-al-'Abbas was born in the Palestinian camp of al-Nayrab in Aleppo in 1948. Carlos belongs to a wealthy leftist communist family; Abu-al-'Abbas belongs to a poor Palestinian family that emigrated from a village in northern Palestine and settled in a small camp erected on the outskirts of Syria's second largest city.

Abu-al-'Abbas undoubtedly knows Carlos well, but no organizational link connected the two, even though the former was one of the most prominent officials of the Popular Front-General Command [PFLP-GC] before he seceded from it and formed the Palestine Liberation Front [PLF]. The PFLP-GC was part of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP], to which Carlos belonged in the early seventies. He became one of the most prominent leaders of its European cell, founded by Dr. Wadi' Haddad, which carried out a series of big operations in that period.

Carlos entered the field of Palestinian activity through the gate of Moscow's famous Patrice Lumumba University. Before that he spent time in Cuba, where he was impressed by the country's experiment and by the experience of the famous revolutionary Che Guevara. Abu-al-'Abbas, on the other hand, entered the field through the gate of Damascus University, which was an ideological center. After the defeat of June 1967, it became a major gateway for the call to armed struggle as a response to this defeat.

Despite this resemblance that may appear close in many ways, the greatest difference between the two is that Abu-al-'Abbas was against so-called "external operations." He is not recorded to have targeted any European or American target. Indeed, he is not recorded to have operated outside the framework of the immediate Palestinian-Israeli confrontation. On the other hand, the operations that Carlos carried out—estimated to number over 80—were all external operations. They targeted French, Austrian, German, and European targets generally.

According to information leaked to AL-MAJALLAH, developments and efforts by many intelligence agencies have resulted in quashing the charges leveled against Abu-al-'Abbas and the rescinding of two pursue-and-arrest bulletins issued against him in 1986, one American, the other Italian.

Beginning of the Story

Abu-al-'Abbas began his history of Palestinian activism by joining a group one of whose most prominent figures was the current general secretary of the PFLP-GC, Ahmad Jibril. Most of its members were Palestinians from the Syrian camps. It had used the name "Palestine Liberation Front" before merging into the PFLP. The latter had emerged from the well-known Arab nationalists' movement led by Dr. George Habash, which included among its prominent figures Nayif Hawatimah from Jordan, Hani al-Hindi from Syria, Dr. Ahmad al-Khatib from Kuwait, and Muhsin Ibrahim and Muhammad Kishli [name as transliterated] from Lebanon.

The group's merger with the PFLP did not last long. Disagreement soon broke out between a group that considered itself a single direction and an organization that had inherited the well-known and famous Arab nationalists' movement. Toward the end of 1968, the PFLP-GC emerged, led by former Syrian army officer Ahmad Jibril. Among its best-known officials, in addition to Abu-al-'Abbas, were the late Tal'at Ya'qub, Fadl Shururu, and the late 'Ali Bushnaq.

In subsequent years, after the move from Jordan to Lebanon, disagreement broke out in the ranks of the PFLP-GC. Abu-al-'Abbas became leader of a group that later constituted the PLF. Tal'at Ya'qub was chosen as its figurehead general secretary. Among its prominent figures were current PLO Executive Committee member 'Ali Ishaq and the famous novelist Rashad Abu-Shawar.

Abu-al-'Abbas did not engage in terrorism in the ordinary sense, but he did carry out a number of noteworthy operations in northern Palestine through south Lebanon. He originated the idea of using gliders, which became a noteworthy method in the operations of some Palestinian groups against Israeli targets in Galilee in 1982. Some people have called this the Lebanese period.

After Lebanon

When the resistance left Lebanon, Abu-al-'Abbas, who had strong relations with Syria, chose to go to Damascus for many reasons. When the well-known Palestinian split

occurred in the spring of 1983, beginning with Fatah and soon including the entire Palestinian scene, this Palestinian official [Abu-al-'Abbas] sided with Palestinian Chairman Yasir 'Arafat and moved to reside in Tunis. On the other hand, his PLF comrade, Tal'at Ya'qub, who subsequently died, remained in the Syrian capital and chose a neutral position in the conflict.

To reward him for this position, the Palestinian chairman threw all his weight on the side of Abu-al-'Abbas, who was chosen to be a member of the PLO Executive Committee. His relations with Damascus began to worsen during this period. Damascus sided with the dissidents against Fatah and the PLO. He began to draw closer to Iraq, which needed every group that disagreed with Syria.

Perhaps one of the most important things to be examined in the context of the alleged peace between Abu-al-'Abbas and the CIA is the fact that this Palestinian official was able to knit firm relations during and after the Lebanese period with Algerian military intelligence, which the Algerian Government had assigned to deal with most of the Palestinian factions, and with the successive leaders of Algerian intelligence—especially with former prime minister Kasdi Merbah (later assassinated by extremists), Brigadier General Mejdoub Lakhhal-ayat, and Elhadj Tahar [name as transliterated].

Because of the nature of his duties as leader of a Palestinian group in need of arms and security cooperation with certain Arab states supporting the Palestinian resistance, Abu-al-'Abbas is known to have established relations intermittently or continuously with the security apparatus in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other Arab states.

Achille Lauro

After siding with Palestinian Chairman Yasir 'Arafat and moving to Tunisia, Abu-al-'Abbas began to be more interested in naval operations than in land operations from south Lebanon. This was because he had lost his former solid base in Lebanon and the camps of the south. He established two camps for this purpose in two Arab states with a Mediterranean coast.

During this period, special Fatah units under the leadership of the Britisher Ian Walison [name as transliterated], who remains held in a Nicosia prison, carried out the well-known Larnaca operation that targeted a woman who worked in Israeli intelligence. She was said to have been responsible for the 1979 assassination of Palestinian intelligence agent Abu-Hasan Salamah (alias "the Red Prince") in Beirut. Israel responded by launching the well-known attack on the headquarters of the Palestinian leadership at Hammam al-Shatt in Tunisia in the fall of 1985. The raid caused the death of more than 30 Palestinian cadres. Palestinian Chairman Yasir 'Arafat miraculously escaped.

Under pressure of the sharpening confrontation between the PLO and Israel, Abu-al-'Abbas decided to mount a swift operation in retaliation for the Hammam al-Shatt

raid. He sent an armed group on board the Italian ship *Achille Lauro*, which sailed for Israel from the Italian port of Genoa in October. The group hijacked the ship to the port of Ashdod near the Gaza Strip to strike at an Israeli military base located in the vicinity of this port.

As everyone knows, the hijacking failed. The armed men sent by Abu-al-'Abbas killed the elderly American Jew, Leon Klinghoffer. After a long scenario, the armed men gave themselves up to Egyptian authorities. Abu-al-'Abbas, who participated in the negotiations to guarantee a peaceful end of the operation, accompanied the armed men to escort them back to Tunis aboard a special Egyptian plane placed at their disposal. American fighter planes intercepted the plane after it left Egyptian air space and forced it to land at an American military base in Italy.

After the Egyptian plane landed at the American air base in Italy, the Americans tried to take Abu-al-'Abbas for transport to the United States for trial on many charges, including the murder of the Jewish-American Leon Klinghoffer, whose body was recovered from the shore at Baniyas by the Syrian navy and turned over to American authorities. However, the Italian authorities refused. Many countries intervened. Agreement was reached to move this Palestinian official to Yugoslavia. He later went to Iraq, moving between there and Algeria, Libya, and sometimes Tunisia.

Then, on the basis of confessions by the aforementioned men, the Italian appeals court in Genoa in July 1986 sentenced Abu-al-'Abbas in absentia to life imprisonment. Two bulletins for his arrest—one Italian, the other American—were also issued.

Kuwaiti Mediation

The important point is that after this operation Abu-al-'Abbas became in the eyes of many Western circles, particularly American ones, one of the main symbols of terrorism in the Middle East. A subsequent unsuccessful operation by the PLF, headed by this Palestinian official, launched from Libya toward the coast of occupied Palestine, served as the straw that broke the camel's back. The United States broke off the dialogue it had begun with the PLO. Muhammad 'Abbas Zaydan was black-listed by most Western countries.

Another irony is that Abu-al-'Abbas, whose relations with Kuwait were good—Kuwaiti authorities had agreed to his opening an office there like the other Palestinian factions, especially Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC—asked the Kuwaitis according to one source's version to settle his problems with the United States and intercede with Washington and many Western countries to remove his name from the blacklists.

These sources say that Kuwait exerted great efforts in the matter. Just when it was beginning to make some progress, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came, throwing

everything into confusion and doing away with interest in the whole issue. Abu-al-'Abbas sided with Iraq in the sudden new conflict, and he threatened to launch painful strikes on American targets. In actual fact, he engaged in no operation worth mentioning, and he did not carry out in the slightest way any of the threats he had made.

Thus he has spent the entire period after the second Gulf war in Iraq, with brief visits to Algeria, Libya, and occasionally Tunisia. As time passed and as the Middle East peace process made great progress, especially after the signing of the well-known Oslo agreements, Abu-al-'Abbas again went to Algeria and found refuge with his old friends in Algerian intelligence.

Algerian intelligence, busy with the war of confrontation with Islamic extremists, has longstanding links with the Spanish security apparatus. It asked the latter to help "whiten" Abu-al-'Abbas's record with the CIA and the United States.

Sources have told AL-MAJALLAH that the Syrian businessman Mundhir al-Kassar, arrested a few years ago in Spain on charges of connections with violence and released later from prison on high bail, played a large role in the operation, motivated by his old relations with Abu-al-'Abbas.

Some sources of information say that the settlement between the American agency and Abu-al-'Abbas was worked out in Spain with the participation and help of Algerian intelligence. Other sources of information say that the deal was worked out in Algeria and that the active role in it belonged to Algerian intelligence.

Price of the Deal

If this information proves to be true, the question is what price the West and Western agencies were paid to erase the name of Abu-al-'Abbas from the blacklist and rescind the bulletins for his arrest, including the previously mentioned American and Italian ones.

One notes that Abu-al-'Abbas's statements to the Spanish newspaper *EL MUNDO* only a week before Carlos was arrested in Khartoum and taken to Paris for trial on numerous charges of murder and destruction contained what constituted a complete reversal of the Palestinian official's former hardline positions against the Middle East peace process.

In these statements Abu-al-'Abbas announced that he was a supporter of the peace process, that it was time for negotiation, and the Americans held the key to peace in the region. He announced that self-rule in Gaza and Jericho was an agreement in principle that "was headed in the right direction to bring us closer to the goal."

More importantly, Abu-al-'Abbas criticized the operations in Britain and Argentina that targeted Israeli centers. He said they would not stop the peace process and

were an attempt to reverse time and history. He also expressed great regret over the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985.

Is this everything? Were mere sorrow over the Achille Lauro operation and condemnation of the Buenos Aires and London operations the price that the United States, the Western countries, and Israel collected for opening a new page with Abu-al-'Abbas, removing his name from the terrorism lists, and allowing him afterward to live in Gaza and the West Bank?

One notes that the Spanish newspaper asked Abu-al-'Abbas about the Lebanese 'Imad Mughniyah, whom the SUNDAY TELEGRAPH said was involved in the London and Argentine bombings. He answered, "Mughniyah is a very important person. He is a Lebanese Shiite closely connected to Iran. He was always said to be behind the kidnapping of Westerners in Beirut. Given the importance of his contacts, he may have been behind the recent operations."

Abu-al-'Abbas certainly was asked many questions by American and Spanish intelligence—perhaps also by French intelligence—about the well-known Lockerbie operation, about Carlos, now on trial in France, about many operations and kidnappings of foreigners in Lebanon, and about the airplane hijackings that were common at one stage of Palestinian revolutionary activity.

What were Abu-al-'Abbas's answers? Did he turn over all of his rich and extensive files to Western intelligence in exchange for pardon and the removal of his name from the blacklists?

Islamic Jihad Leader Interviewed

94AA0125A Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 10 Sep 94 pp 5-8

[Interview With Dr. Fathi al-Shiqaqi, Palestinian Islamic Jihad secretary general; place and date not given: "In Exclusive Interview with AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI, Palestinian Islamic Jihad Secretary General Dr. Fathi al-Shiqaqi Says: People Will Discover That Hardship Under Intifadah Has Been Nobler, More Honorable, and Lighter Than Hardship Under Fancied Independence; Opposition Factions Suffer From Internal Flabbiness Inherited Throughout Tens of Years; Islamic Jihad Will Not Take Part in Self-Rule Council; Islamic Jihad Is Reflection of Cultural Vision Within Islamic Movement; 'Fundamentalism' and 'Radicalism' Are Two Pre-Judgmental Words; Opposition's Unity Is Extremely Important; Repatriation Is Sacred Right and What Has Been Accomplished in This Regard Is Tantalizing to Nothing More Than Dust Thrown in Eyes; We Don't Exclude Alternative Homeland Option Even Though Other Possibilities Are Extant"—first two paragraphs are AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Prelude

The Oslo accord and subsequent Palestinian-Israeli accords have ultimately led to the PLO leadership's entry into Gaza and Jericho within the framework of the so-called transitional phase. The accords have also afflicted Palestinian opposition with confusion, requiring it to unite through a serious and frank dialogue that is far from the framework of the 10 factions produced by the Madrid conference. This framework has failed to prove its feasibility.

On the real condition of the Palestinian national and Islamic opposition and of Islamic Jihad in particular, AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI has conducted this calm and serious interview with Dr. Fathi al-Shiqaqi, Palestinian Islamic Jihad secretary general. In the interview, we have dealt with Islamic Jihad's assessment and view of the entire reality of Palestinian daily life in the occupied territories, with the general Palestinian political reality, and with Islamic Jihad's position vis-a-vis this reality.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] What is your assessment of the current Palestinian phase and of the Cairo accord?

[Al-Shiqaqi] The nation is experiencing a disturbing nightmare unprecedented in Arab and Islamic history, and perhaps horrible labor pains at the same time. Our nation, not just our Palestinian people, is faced with oppressive attempts to subjugate it forcefully and to make it abandon its identity, disavow its history, and offer a public apology for what is noblest in its character. Our nation is to do all this in return for its inclusion in the maelstrom of delusions, which mean nothing in actual reality except more fragmentation, backwardness, and subservience to others.

Our Palestinian people are required, according to the dictates and conditions of the internationally supported enemy, to admit and acknowledge that they have no right to Palestine and that they are a transient minority in their own country.

Yasir 'Arafat, and the self-rule authority along with him, represents a historical role that contradicts the logic of history. How can a 30-year revolution, crowned with a unique and distinguished intifadah by all criteria, culminate with the creation of an apparatus whose task it is to be an instrument in the occupation's hand? If not for the performance of this task, even self-rule wouldn't exist.

'Arafat has rendered the occupation a major service by taking over the Gaza Strip under these circumstances. Hot chestnuts were burning the palms of the enemy who was paying an exorbitant daily price for his occupation of Gaza, with its special circumstances. The occupation has handed Gaza over to 'Arafat alone. Gaza hasn't gained its independence, and there is no independence for the West Bank, where the picture will become clearer. Outwardly, there has been withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. But the West Bank remains under Israeli sovereignty. There are 125,000 settlers who move with utter freedom throughout the West Bank, going wherever they

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wish to go under Israeli sovereignty. The imagined transfer of powers doesn't deprive the occupation of anything. Education was Jordanian in the West Bank and Egyptian in the Gaza Strip. Now, things will be worse. The self-rule authority has entangled itself in a problem. Whereas the occupation was required to cover the costs of building schools and of paying salaries (all of which constitute no more than a small part of the Palestinian economy that has been plundered in the interest of Israel), the Palestinian authority, which has declared its fiscal inability, has to shoulder all these costs now. The occupation has omitted some pages from school textbooks. The Palestinian authority has to abide by the accord and omit more pages while inserting more calamitous deception into the curricula. The Palestinian authority has to collect taxes, which the occupation was often unable to collect because of our kinsmen's resistance. The authority has to pay a part of this tax to the occupation under various provisions and monikers, of which customs fees and economic services aren't the only forms. The new economic arrangements in their entirety impede the Palestinian economy and worsen people's lives.

Now that the self-rule authority has committed itself to this humiliating and unfair accord and its airtight provisions, this authority will not be able to break away from the accord today or tomorrow. The Zionist scheme is triumphant, tyrannical, despotic, domineering, and U.S.-supported. The new authority is nothing but an instrument implementing this scheme.

As for lifting the people's hardship, this is an illusion that people must forget, and they will realize ultimately that hardship under the intifadah was nobler and more honorable, even lighter than hardship under the imagined independence.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Where is the opposition to the accord and what is the role this opposition is required to play now?

[Al-Shiqaqi] Opposition in the general sense exists within every Palestinian, and I am not excluding many of those who march with the accord's bandwagon now. Can any Palestinian expel Palestine from his soul, conscience, and from under his skin? Opposition is a normal voluntary and involuntary action in a case like this. But the balances of power are oppressing the souls of many. Some of these souls are breaking up as if they were a handful of dust. But the spirit of the people and of the group cannot be broken and it will continue to fight in various forms and shapes. In its special sense and as a political indicator, opposition is a reflection of this spirit. Factional opposition, which is what you mean, is a part of this opposition. This factional opposition is experiencing extremely complex and difficult subjective and objective circumstances.

Here, frankness is essential to move toward what is required and desired, and also inevitable. The first thing to reveal frankly is that all the factions are experiencing

internal flabbiness, which they have inherited from tens of years of bureaucracy, militarism, despotism, and pseudo-genius [as published]. They have not dared rejuvenate or revolutionize, whereas the phase is amazingly dangerous and sensitive and requires the efforts of a genius to stem the collapse, at least.

The first thing required of this effort is that it be the vessel that carries a healthy and capable plan and, certainly, that it constitute a part of this plan.

Second, there is a crisis of confidence among the opposition tendencies and factions. Some parties suspect that the opposition of others isn't serious, and vice versa. Even though this suspicion is founded largely on illusion and poor opinion, it still impedes serious congruence and understanding.

Third, as happens in the phases of cultural decline and disintegration, individual tendencies rise at the expense of the public interest. In the opposition, as in other circles, priority is given to one's organization and faction and not to the broader and more comprehensive framework. Intrinsic viewpoint and interest are given precedence at the expense of public interest.

Fourth, for the first time in its history, the Palestinian resistance finds itself without an international or regional cover, whereas the world in its entirety provides cover for the Palestinian party involved in the settlement and gives round-the-clock support to this party.

Rather, opposition forces scarcely receive the reasonable or noteworthy material aid they received in past phases.

All these reasons collectively have put the Palestinian opposition in a difficult position, despite all the efforts it makes. Under the umbrella of exclusive U.S. control, the waves continue to be high and furious. Thus, others don't notice the effort the opposition makes.

In any case, the opposition hasn't exhausted its effort or its purpose and it can still do a lot vis-a-vis an ugly and fragile accord. The opposition can do this if it rejuvenates its spirit, its structure, and its methods of action and if it unites its efforts even further, but after it engages in a more serious and profound dialogue that eliminates the causes of mistrust. Unity of the opposition forces is an extremely important matter that must not be delayed. This unity must be founded on a minimal program that rejects the accord, calls for toppling it, and supports continuation of the intifadah and of armed struggle in all of Palestine.

Moreover, the results of any plan don't surface immediately, and we need time to evaluate the opposition action. There is no doubt that the opposition has played a noticeable role against the settlement. The opposition has been able, at least, to prevent defeat from spreading to broad sectors of our people by keeping the banner of hope and the banner of struggle flying. A political plan fails only when its enactment stops or when people back away from it. As long as the Palestinian forces opposing

the settlement firmly maintain their course, it cannot be said that they have failed. If the opposition can stem the collapse now, it will make a significant accomplishment that will have its direct positive impact on the situation and on the people.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] There are those who say and allege that Islamic Jihad is a radical fundamentalist movement. What is your response to this allegation?

[Al-Shiqaqi] The words "fundamentalism" and "radicalism" are two prejudicial words that have a tremendous negative effect politically and in the media.

Here, fundamentalism doesn't mean a return to the origins but a self-contained vision that is disdainful of the real situation; that is governed by absolute hostility toward others; and that pulls society into backwardness, retreat, and darkness. Radicalism means going to extremes, rejecting reconciliation, and disavowing tolerance and social coexistence. It means resorting to violence because of the sheer desire for violence; of the inability to confront; and of fear of openness. Here, radicalism doesn't mean fundamentalism. It disavows revolutionism and it glorifies terrorism. The word even signifies suppressed gangsterism.

Palestine's Islamic Jihad is the reflection of a cultural vision within the Islamic movement. This vision has believed, and continues to believe, that Islam is the nation's glory, the essence of its identity, and the mover of its history. We are an Islamic Palestinian political movement and we believe that liberating Palestine is the practical course for the plan for Islamic revival. Zionism is a complex reflection of a prolonged war that has lasted more than a century against our nation. This war was launched by the West and the United States to distort our nation, to seize its wealth and its lands, and to turn this nation, both people and land, into raw material to be used by the machine of world imperialism. Zionism is, moreover, a reflection of the meeting of the interests of world imperialism, of some radical Jews and capitalists, and of some professional politicians in establishing a political entity for Jews so this entity would perform an advance political and military function for the imperialist scheme and would seek to expand at the expense of the Arab and Islamic nation. But this is no solution for the Jewish issue. Rather, it is a solution at the expense of Jews and against their humanity. We aren't against Jews or Judaism. But we refuse to see Judaism, which is a divine religion, take the form of racist political action that is opposed to humanity and to the course of history. It is our duty to fight against this distortion that was created by colonialism when it turned Jews into invading battalions seeking to defeat the region.

Is this fundamentalism? Is this radicalism?

If fundamentalism and radicalism mean defending the homeland and man's dignity, as well as man's right to preserve his faith and his right to a creativity that

enriches mankind; adds to its assets; and emanates from its faith and belief, then nobody can reject such fundamentalism and radicalism.

Those who raise the charge of fundamentalism and radicalism as a weapon with which to confront those who reject servility, inability, and fear, especially fear of the United States and Israel, are the ones who practice fundamentalism and radicalism in their worst forms against the world's powerless peoples. They practice them through political oppression, economic humiliation, all forms of plunder, open and insolent intervention in peoples' fates, and through acts of cultural and social distortion and of media domination. There is no need to cite examples or to dwell on details. Perhaps some forms of radicalism among the oppressed are an acceptable logical and normal reaction to the U.S. and Zionist radicalism.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Is there dialogue between your movement and Fatah, especially with opponents of the accord?

[Al-Shiqaqi] To date there is no official dialogue between us and Fatah, if Fatah means the faction representing the self-rule authority. However, we are engaged in an open dialogue with all Palestinian strugglers to reject and confront the Zionist scheme, regardless of the positions and affiliations of these strugglers. We have had some meetings with a number of Fatah notables recently. We also continue to have contacts with notables who have a vision that is different from the vision of those in the PLO who sponsor the Zionist scheme.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] Do you expect to participate in the self-rule council election that is expected to be held at this year's end? What is your position on the accord, and do you have any official or unofficial contacts with the self-rule authority?

[Al-Shiqaqi] We will not take part in the self-rule council election. According to the official accords, this council is an instrument in the occupation's hand. We refuse to participate in any process that gives legitimacy to the agreement that entrenches the occupation.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] What is your opinion of the repatriation of a large number of Palestinians in the self-rule areas? Don't you consider this a political accomplishment and, as some people say, a "bright spot" in the Palestinian-Israeli accord?

[Al-Shiqaqi] Repatriation is a sacred natural right. We struggle for this end. But those who have returned aren't large in number. They don't exceed several thousand, whereas there are more than 2 million Palestinians in the diaspora and in exile. Our people at home number more than 3 million. Whoever returns to the homeland has to go through the Israeli "screening machine." Those who have returned are small in number, and they will not disturb the Zionist scheme in any way. Moreover, they return to where Israeli sovereignty still reigns.

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This process amounts to no more than dust thrown in the eyes. It is a substitute for the repatriation of all those for whose return the struggle should have been continued. Therefore, this repatriation isn't an accomplishment within the political context. So, there isn't a single bright spot in this accord.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] There are intellectual disagreements within the opposition factions. How can these factions develop a common position, and what is required of them so they will shoulder their responsibilities toward the current phase?

[Al-Shiqaqi] Intellectual disagreements are a foregone conclusion and not the subject of argument. The 10 factions made an important accomplishment when they surmounted their intellectual disagreements and gave priority to the political program. I don't believe that intellectual disagreements impede our action or delay our political tasks.

We want a deeper and more serious dialogue in order to eliminate the suspicions among the opposition factions. We always call for putting the public interest ahead of private interests so we can overcome the weakness afflicting the opposition faction's march. We can accomplish practical results in the interest of the Palestinian cause and people and against the Zionist scheme's domination. We realize that our joint action is important to confront the dues payable in the next phase, such as normalization, erasing the Palestinian memory, and driving the nation to despair by giving it the impression that everything has ended and that the fait accompli policy has imposed its logic on everybody. The opposition factions undertake, each according to its position, important responsibilities to defend our people and our nation. But what is required is much more than what is possible. Our people interact with the political forces according to the degree of these forces' credibility, sacrifices, and adherence to the political realities that underline and defend the Palestinian facts. What is always required is sacrifice, honesty, interaction with the people, and commitment to their concerns.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] What is your comment on the release of certain detainees and not others?

[Al-Shiqaqi] It is taken for granted that all prisoners will be released when a political settlement accord is concluded. One farce of the accords that have produced the self-rule government is that these accords have failed to secure this minimal requirement, i.e., prisoners' release, which is supposed to be a foregone conclusion. What the accords have accomplished is the release of just some prisoners in return for conditions and restrictions, constituting one of the more disgraceful aspects of the agreement and exposing the character of this agreement as a dictated contract of capitulation that grants the weaker party nothing at all.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] What do you expect of the future? Is there a certain scenario that may materialize?

[Al-Shiqaqi] If the settlement process doesn't falter, as we hope, then we will be faced with two basic options: either create some sort of a Palestinian entity below the level of a state and, at the same time, under Zionist control; or have a Hashemite sovereignty that extends from Jordan to the West Bank "enclaves." This option is more favored by the Israelis, and it is gaining growing support in Israel. The West Bank will continue to be "enclaves" in the real sense of the word, because each town will be isolated by Zionist settlements and by Israeli-controlled roads. In this case, the self-rule authority could turn into a military and civil administration controlled by the Hashemite regime.

We don't exclude the alternative homeland option. Zionist circles allege that they have backed away from this option. But the anxiety and tension that the Palestinians are experiencing, and which they will continue to experience because of the lack of a real solution to the problem, could lead to more possibilities.

[AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI] What form should Palestinian coordination with the Arab and Islamic states and other countries take?

[Al-Shiqaqi] There must be a broad front that encompasses all the forces that are aware of the Zionist threat to the nation and that prepare to confront it. This front should be comprised of states and parties, along with Palestinian strugglers, because the battle is everybody's battle. To counter the isolation and blockade attempts targeting anybody who rejects capitulation, we must seek to enlarge the circle within which we move, and we must build bridges and develop relations that serve our common interests and causes.

Editorial Calls for Opposition Parties

94AA0126A Jerusalem ALK-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI
in Arabic 17 Sep 94 p 3

[Editorial by Jacque Khazmo: "Opposition Parties Provide Safety Valve"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Through their constructive opposition and monitoring of all the activities of those who govern and control the government, opposition parties in all the advanced and civilized countries of the world serve to preserve the nation from any imminent danger. They also safeguard the general order from any breakdown.

In general, opposition parties serve the state. They also serve the power structure. They are endowed with their own status, dignity, and respect, because it is essential that opposition parties exist in order to steer the rulers to the correct path and prevent them from making mistakes, or from taking the law into their own hands.

Any regime lacking constructive opposition is considered to be a dictatorial regime. It might lead the country to destruction, problems, and collapse through actions

that have no one to oppose them, reject them, or point out the dangers of proceeding with them.

There is no doubt that opposition parties in any country are a winning card in the hand of the ruler if he were to exploit them in the correct and sound manner. A winning card, if he were negotiating about a certain matter, or if his country were in an adverse situation with neighboring countries.

If we consider Israel, the opposition parties serve the regime. Even if those opposition parties are at times powerful, use cruel expressions, or conduct various campaigns against the current government. The Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhaq Rabin, does not take any step before studying it and securing the assent of his party and those of the coalition. He takes the opposition parties into account. They remain on his mind because he considers them to be the safety valve that ensures making the appropriate and sound decision, which first and foremost, serves the security of the state.

Even though as a people we believe in democracy and sing its praises, we have not used this democracy well. We have not taken advantage of opposition parties, and they were not a winning card in the service of the just cause and in securing gains and achievements. On the contrary, there are those who are attempting to marginalize the role of the opposition parties and destroy them so as to make us lose a great deal and realize the aims of those who oppose us or are negotiating with us about existential and delicate matters.

We attempt to attack the opposition parties and accuse them of all sorts of accusations and attribute many qualities to them instead of coopting them and winning them over to the side of the cause and profiting from their positions and correcting and rectifying any incorrect decision that was taken, whether intentionally or not. This is uncivilized, and a conduct that does not express a desire to practice democracy. This, in our opinion, is what should not go on because it does not serve the higher national interest.

It is incumbent on the governing authority to respect the opposition parties, and likewise, it is incumbent on the opposition parties to respect the executive authority. It is incumbent on both sides to debate and discuss in the interest of the one nation. Various contradictory statements are of no use without debates, communications, and consultations, as well as consideration and respect for the other side's point of view.

It is incumbent upon us to prove that we are a civilized, cultured people and that the freedom to express one's opinion is a sacred matter. Constructive opposition in our land is in the interest of the fatherland and in the service of its causes, and not for its destruction. It is the safety valve that will protect the nation from any harm that results from a decision that might be out of place.

Let there be a conference between sides of differing inclinations, opinions, and principles, and let each know

its rights and the limits of its conduct. Let red lines be placed that may not be crossed by either the opposition or the authorities. We must strive to be as one, and to get through this stage safely and peacefully, not permitting others to fish in troubled waters to destroy us and to destroy our achievements or to deflect us from our honest goals and our firm and genuine positions.

This is our hope and this is the opinion of every honest person, loyal to this beloved fatherland that is undergoing difficult circumstances and a dangerous and delicate stage.

ALGERIA

Working of IMF Accord Gets Positive Review

95AF0002H Algiers EL WATAN in French
20 Sep 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by K. Debbouz: "Positive Conclusions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] International Monetary Fund experts, after reviewing implementation of the first stage of the reverse standby agreement, say Algeria has done a good job meeting performance requirements.

The positive conclusions reached by Fund experts in their meetings with Algerian officials first in Geneva and then last Sunday in Washington should lead the IMF shortly to unblock the second tranche of the \$1.2 billion loan, per terms of the accord. In return, Algeria has pledged to return to financial orthodoxy by normalizing its macroeconomic policies.

For example, the Algerian Government is committed to establishing truth in pricing, currency exchange value, and interest rates. Also, it is obliged to curb inflation, reduce the budgetary deficit, and revive the productive sector through economic growth, etc.

This initial review of the reverse stand-by demonstrated that "implementation of the stabilization program, despite difficult economic circumstances...has already shown significant results in terms of improvements in Algeria's external finance position," according to one Algerian participant. Also, the same source assures us that "inflation is clearly below predicted levels, a fact confirmed by Algeria's success in meeting performance criteria on monetary policy and volume of credit in the economy."

On this latter point, it should be noted that following the \$5 billion debt rescheduling in April, commercial banks have unblocked a large volume of credits tied to imports, most of them for PME's [small and medium-size enterprises]. One banking institution, BNA [National Bank of Algeria], allocated an estimated \$200 million in credits to 1,400 entrepreneurs between May and July this year.

Also, last August the Ministry of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises confirmed some 2,000 investment

applications that have been approved at the primary-bank level since the rescheduling. But even though the external financial crisis is less acute, and official projections call for a significant improvement in budgetary equilibrium (the predicted deficit for 1995 is on the order of 1.23 percent of GDP), the economy is still anemic.

Thus it is still very much an open question whether Algeria will meet its 3-percent growth target for the current year. Also, recent increases in the price of milk and fuel reflect the heavy financial burden that the treasury bears in supporting these products, considering how much they cost. "The significant premium paid for imports, and the relatively low price for which a barrel of oil is sold to refineries here, compared to the international market." The price of milk has risen to 7 dinars [DA], while the price of premium gasoline has gone from DA8.20 to DA9.50.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the IMF stabilization program has allowed Algeria to benefit from what is called an "advantageous" rescheduling, since external indebtedness has been reduced by \$5 billion. But the overall accord, negotiated in the framework of the Paris Club, has been followed by several other bilateral accords.

Negotiations for the rescheduling of public-sector debt to France got under way in Paris yesterday and will conclude today. Private debt is being addressed by a restructuring committee composed of 17 private banks. The committee is supposed to render its "verdict" toward the end of the month. It is also noteworthy that IMF approval of Algeria's readjustment program has opened doors to other multilateral institutions. On 3 October, on the margins of the general assembly of the IMF and World Bank, a special "Algeria" meeting will be held, at which the economic program will be presented to representatives of participating countries and to public and multilateral institutions. At a separate meeting on commercial and economic issues, Algerian representatives will hold discussions with representatives of the financial institutions.

FIS Leaders Explain Circumstances of Release

95AF0002D Algiers LE MATIN in French 25 Sep 94 p 2

[Article by Omar Sahli: "What the Ex-FIS Wants"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the regime has never spelled out what it got in exchange for releasing the leaders of the former FIS [Islamic Salvation Front], three of them have given their own version. Kamel Guemazi, Nouredinne Chigara, and Abdelkader Omar, who had been codetainees with Abassi and were recently freed, talked about the circumstances of their liberation in an interview with the weekly EL OUDJH EL AKHAR.

The three former detainees said "it was pressure from the armed branch of the FIS" that "drove the regime to taking these steps," noting that "the regime was incapable of combating it and was constrained to release the

leaders" of the dissolved FIS when "conditions in the country worsened." In plain words—at least if one can believe the account given by these men who were formerly in detention with Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj—their release was the result of the balance of power shifting in their favor. The reference to a worsening of conditions in the country denotes the fact, as these fundamentalist leaders see it, that the government had no alternative.

One notes in passing that this is nowhere near the kind of compromise that the regime and a number of well-known personalities have urged on the "FIS moderates," though there are moderates aplenty in the regime and among the general public. The three very loquacious ex-detainees disclosed that they "asked the authorities not to keep (Abassi Madani) under house arrest for a lengthy period, and they gave us their promise." Furthermore, Guemazi and his two companions said they accepted their own release only on that condition and still expected all the Islamist detainees to be released. The regime thus made promises while getting nothing in return. Guemazi, whose account is corroborated by Abdelbaki Sahraoui and Rabah Kebir, has at all times maintained that he never made promises. In the absence of any official reaction, informed observers have little choice but to believe them, despite the fact that in political matters the leaders of the dissolved FIS are past masters at the art of duplicity. And to remove any trace of ambiguity as to their intentions, these "FIS moderates" note that the armed groups are an "integral part of its political wing" and refuse to associate themselves with efforts to marginalize these "brothers who have taken up arms." If, then, the leaders of the dissolved FIS put so much emphasis on the matter, it must be because somewhere someone gave them a promise.

So it is difficult to see to what extent and on what grounds the ex-FIS would agree to any compromise to the detriment of the armed groups, even granting that some of the latter might not be under its control. It will be noted that the only compromise to which the ex-FIS agreed was to abandon its original demand to return to the [results of the] annulled elections. But is that enough? Isn't it really, as one observer close to the regime puts it, just a matter of [the FIS] taking a step back the better to leap forward? Because in all their declarations, the leaders of the dissolved party have never renounced their political aim: establishment of a theocratic state that would trample democracy. And that's the whole problem.

Mekhloufi Active in Bechar; Slain GIA Members Named

95AF0002G Algiers LE MATIN in French 24 Sep 94 p 2

[Article by Hanane El Cheikh: "Said Mekhloufi, Moroccan Agent?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Said Mekhloufi, the author of "Civil Disobedience," having received a death threat

from his lieutenant, Baa Azeddine, has fled Algiers and resettled in his original douar, Bechar.

Bechar, a town up to now spared by the terrorists, got its first taste of Mekhloufi's brand of terrorism on 9 September, when the posts and telegraph (PTT) center was attacked by a band of almost two dozen of them acting on the orders of the newly arrived chief from Algiers.

Three terrorists were killed during the operation, and 17 others were arrested, including an agricultural technician, a health technician, a secondary education teacher, three tax inspectors, two businessmen, and two labor inspectors. Far from being "fringe" characters, these people seem to have been indoctrinated and prepared long ago (sleeper networks), just waiting for D-Day to go into action. The majority of those arrested are activists of the Benhadj faction.

But why did Said Mekhloufi, who since 1991 has left a trail of death extending from Algiers to Kabylia, choose to take refuge in the Bechar region?

Evil tongues are quick to suggest that Said Mekhloufi, taking advantage of tensions with Morocco and the closing of the Algerian-Moroccan border, opted to make up with "our friend the king" in order to offer his services.

Especially since this onetime journalist, formerly on the staff of EL MASSA (it was there that he met his second wife, a native of Azzefoun) and later editor in chief of EL MOUNKID—before being fired by the late Bachir Fkih over a disagreement with Abassi Madani—is now anathema to both the GIA [armed Islamic group] and the AIS [Islamic Salvation Army] and thus has nothing more to lose and everything to gain from allying himself with the royal palace.

Thevenot Affair

Abou Meriem, who has been a fugitive since 1992 and is implicated in the Thevenot affair (the two French hostages captured on 24 October 1993 by the GIA and subsequently freed by security forces in downtown Algiers), has been killed, along with Abdeslam Ahmed alias El [words missing] commando at El Hadjeb (west Biskra) by security forces.

It should also be noted that Abou Meriem was a high-ranking member of the GIA. He had even replaced Layada in Algiers. It was he who prepared the famous letter sent to Mrs. Thevenot after her release on 3 October 1993. A copy of that letter turned up in France, in the domicile of Moussa Kraouche.

Accused by the GIA of incompetence after the freeing of the French hostages, Abou Meriem joined up with the AIS in Barika and Tolga. Having close ties to Si Mozrag, an attorney and financial backer for the Benhadj faction, he prevailed on sentiments of regional solidarity to take

refuge many times at the latter's home in Birkhadem. Abou Meriem was implicated in the terrorist attack at Boughezoul.

Also, his father and uncle are harkis [Algerians who served with French forces during the war of independence], and his cousin, a 32-year-old merchant, is a member of the Islamic Salvation Front-dominated people's communal assembly in Djezar (west Batna), Abou Meriem's birthplace.

During the operation that brought Meriem down, which was prompted by information furnished by a private citizen, two Browning automatic pistols were recovered. Inasmuch as this type of weapon is not used by Algerian security services, they were probably smuggled into the country by the Djamel Lounici network (the Germany-France-Morocco connection). The Browning is a rather expensive Belgian make.

Mujahidin Beheaded

Security forces have also killed Nasri Tounsi, one of the principal instigators of the Tazoult prison breakout (almost a thousand prisoners escaped). Tounsi, a former prison guard, was the man who gave the keys to the prisoners and killed the chief sentry.

His cousin, Nasri Rabah, another prison guard, was killed in early September in the Guelma region.

Meanwhile, terrorist actions have reached an unprecedented level of savagery.

An FLN [National Liberation Front party] militant, Djamel Azzedine, was slaughtered in El Taref, and a mujahidin was decapitated and his head hung on a post on the road leading out of Birkhadem.

Abassi Madani, Ali Benhadj Profiled

94AF0280A Paris LE MONDE in French 15 Sep 94 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Freed FIS Leaders Profiled"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Madani: Tactician

"With Islam, you can't pick and choose: It all goes together," he often says, projecting the benign, unflappable air of a shrewd father who in managing his household knows when to push and when to yield. Playing first on nationalism, later on the Koran, Abassi Madani has striven ceaselessly to impose his vision of Algeria. At the cost of spending seven years behind bars during the war of national liberation, and being sentenced, on 12 July 1992, to 12 years imprisonment without possibility of parole for "conspiracy against the authority of the state," together with Ali Benhadj, the other "star" in the firmament of the Islamic Salvation Front [FIS].

With his reddish beard and twinkling eyes, white cap and embroidered "jebba," this world-class "agitator," son of an imam, was born in 1931 in Sidi-Okba, near Biskra in eastern Algeria. He began his studies in Koranic school and went on to the University of Algiers, where he received a bachelor's degree in philosophy and worked toward a Ph.D in psychology and educational sciences, going on to London to defend his thesis. A teacher who boasts of having "studied both ancient and modern thought from Confucius to Bertrand Russell, forgetting nothing," of "reading *Das Kapital* in Arabic, English, and French," he used his studies to gain more knowledge about his adversaries and learn how to argue with them on their own terms.

'We the Majority'

The father of a large family—five sons and a daughter—Madani, who deplores birth control as "degrading to human beings," is neither a good theologian nor a good orator. "I am a very simple man with simple needs," he says of himself. But his capacity for hard work, his self-control, and above all his flair for politics propelled him to the top of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] hierarchy from the moment of its creation, in February 1989—first as spokesman, later as its real leader.

After the bloody uprisings of October 1988, profiting from the strong prodemocracy winds of change whipping up all over the country, Abassi Madani emerged from the shadows. In June 1990, he ran the successful local elections campaign of the "party of God," and a year later declared war on the regime, leading a "general, unlimited strike." As a result of which he found himself, together with his lieutenants, behind bars at the military prison in Blida.

From his prison cell, this man who has played so adroitly on the resentments and frustrations of the populace—especially the young—by exploiting the incompetence of the public authorities saw the FIS transformed from a legitimate political party into a clandestine movement. Madani justifies everything by saying: "We are the majority." But would he have countenanced the use of violence? He is probably too shrewd, too cagy, to have taken a simplistic "yes or no" position on the question.

Much less blunt than Ali Benhadj—with whom, it is said, his relations at Blida prison were strained—Madani has tried to give the "party of God" a less frightening image, even going so far as to declare himself an "ardent partisan of pluralism, the sole guarantee of liberty"—at least until the way is cleared for proclamation of an Islamic state.

Madani is probably the man best positioned to renew the Islamists' dialogue with the regime. With all the wisdom of his experience, this self-described "student of history" unquestionably knows that the kingdom of Allah is not always to be won by the impatient...

Benhadj: Grand Inquisitor

Sharp as a sword's edge, Ali Benhadj has very definite views about the march of events in the world at large and

Algeria in particular, and when he talks about them he pulls no punches, rhetorically or otherwise, regardless of the consequences. "Our party doesn't promise electricity or water or housing, like the others," this "shock preacher" likes to say. It has only one goal: establishment of a true Islamic state. This is what most alarms people.

Fragile, Taciturn

Born in Tunis in 1956 but raised in the Bechar region of southwestern Algeria, Ali Benhadj, cofounder and number-two man of the former FIS, was schooled in the shadow of minarets. This activist—whose childhood friends viewed him at the time as "someone different, fragile, and taciturn, spending all his time devouring books"—linked up, in the early 1980's, with Mustapha Bouyali, organizer of an "Islamist underground" in greater Algiers. "An instructive experience," he said of it later.

These dangerous liaisons earned him a stint in prison, followed by almost five years of house arrest. More resolute than ever, this outlaw with thin, ascetic features and beardless face then established himself in Algiers, where his incendiary sermons—at the El-Sunna mosque in Bab-el-Oued and the Ben-Badis mosque in Kouba—quickly attracted huge crowds, including many of the city's poor and its unemployed youths, who loved to hear him denounce, in unusually violent terms, "socialism, communism, democracy, and dictatorship, all that dung in the rubbish heap of the human spirit."

Amid the political upheaval that began with the October 1988 uprisings, this father of four teamed up with Abassi Madani, serving as the latter's point man and firebrand. On 30 June 1991, after the general strike—during which he had called "on the people to gather up all the weapons they can find"—Benhadj was arrested. On 15 July 1992, the Blida military tribunal, which found him guilty of "armed conspiracy against the security of the state," sentenced him to 12 years imprisonment without possibility of parole.

The worldly justice that he so despises is at least offering him the chance to carve out his destiny as a "martyr." The only injunctions that this grand inquisitor intends to respect are those of God. "There will never be a television in my house," he said once. "I don't listen to music because the shari'ah (Islamic law) forbids it." He says he has far better things to do, at a time when "the whole world is gnashing its teeth like a rabid dog in its rage to exterminate every one of us..."

Citizens React to Release of Madani, Benhadj

94AF0280C Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Sep 94 p 4

[Unattributed article: "In Algiers, More Doubt than Enthusiasm"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Algiers—Will the release of two top leaders of the former Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj, put a brake on the

violence? Some capital residents, much more concerned about civil peace than about the political negotiations under way, have their doubts.

Surprised by the unexpected announcement on television the afternoon of Tuesday, 13 September, the attitude of some Algiers residents is more one of doubt than enthusiasm or fear. For others, the release of the "historic" leaders of the ex-FIS came as no surprise. The rumor mill was so active in recent days that unemployed youths in the capital were announcing to passersby, in their typically humorous way, that wearing the hidjab (Islamic veil) would be mandatory beginning 31 December.

Djamal, a student from Bab Ezzouar, a former FIS sympathizer whose enthusiasm has been tempered by all the terrorism, welcomes news of the release but cherishes no illusions. "We have lost too much time. It has taken 10,000 deaths to get us back to where we left off," he says. He makes no effort to conceal his misgivings about the sincerity of the regime's intent to resume the electoral process. In his residential quarter, Kouba, an Islamist stronghold in the eastern part of the city, people have been scarred too badly—by the almost daily killings that have left their mark on so many households—to jump to conclusions.

Hassiba, a teacher from Belcourt, a neighborhood in the older part of town that was renamed "Kabul" and was a fiefdom of Ali Benhadj, expresses her misgivings: "Will this measure stop the violence?" Such sentiments clearly show the malaise afoot in Algiers, whose many problems are exacerbated by the frustrations of everyday life: water cutoffs, breakdowns in the telephone system, high cost of living, etc. Malika, an elderly inhabitant of the Casbah, still waits for the return of her only son, currently imprisoned. Nothing has been said about the "amnesty" that constitutes one of the key issues in the political "dialogue."

MCB Call To Boycott Schools Said Effective

95AF0001D Algiers EL WATAN in French,
15 Sep 94 p 5

[Article by D. Benabi: "Schools Completely Paralyzed"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tizi-Ouzou—Five days after it was launched in the governorates of Tizi-Ouzou, Bejaia, and Bouira, the school boycott called by the MCB (Berber Cultural Movement) to last until the Tamazight language is recognized and taught has largely lived up to expectations.

In both Tizi-Ouzou and Bejaia, the schools have been completely deserted by students and in some cases by the teachers themselves. Only the Bouira Governorate has not gone along with the movement in a significant manner.

Beyond that popular reaction to an injustice affecting one of Algeria's foundations, the silence on the part of the authorities is what remains inexplicable for the moment, and it is giving rise to many questions.

The MCB has given the authorities two weeks in which to take a clear and unequivocal stand on the subject: the recognition and teaching of Tamazight.

According to statements by two members of the government, however, the response to that demand, in support of which millions of citizens have rallied, will not be forthcoming immediately in such a way as to defuse this "time bomb."

The impatience of some people over that silence by the government does not give us reason to anticipate a peaceful future. The MCB, according to leaders of both its factions, is determined "to continue the struggle, including recourse to other peaceful means of action, until this demand, resolution of which has been postponed indefinitely many times, is satisfied."

For example, in addition to boycotting classes, people's marches will be held in many localities in the governorate, and they will be punctuated by a national march in Tizi-Ouzou—a "remake" of those held last 17 and 25 January in support of the same cause.

"Ridding the schools of everything that serves to negate the values of tolerance, humanism, and democracy," as desired by the initiators of the boycott, also requires a revision of the hiring standards for positions of responsibility in the educational sector. During this boycott, participation in which is amounting to nearly 100 percent in the Tizi-Ouzou Governorate, reactions peculiar to the period when the single party was in power have suddenly resurfaced.

School chiefs appointed to their posts because of their toadying ability—almost all of them from the same village that took over education—have tried, by their scandalous behavior, to stop a popular movement by use of the most shameful and supposedly abandoned methods.

In Tizi-Ouzou, a lycee principal did not hesitate to provide a falsified figure on the number of students just so Minister of Transportation Isli could say that the opening of the school year "had been 100-percent successful."

In Tadmaït, 17 km west of Tizi-Ouzou, a primary school principal and the female principal of a CEM [college of intermediate studies], both of whom have had their jobs for over 20 years, did not hesitate to use threats of punishment to force the students crowded around the main doors to go to their classrooms. What is more, "Madam Baroness," as she is nicknamed by her subordinates, is not hesitating to tell the students that "places in her school are going to be expensive"—even though the school she heads is a state-owned CEM open to all Algerian citizens.

Despite those reactions, which after all were expected, the MCB has not changed by one iota its determination to struggle until its main demand—Tamazight in the schools—is completely satisfied. Meeting that demand will inevitably be accompanied by a thorough revamping of the school system.

The beginnings of a new "Berber spring" are much in evidence, and the days to come promise to be hot ones.

All the administrative districts in the Tizi-Ouzou Governorate have now established a schedule for their marches pending the general strikes that will affect the economic and administrative sectors successively. On the day after 20 September, when the dialogue initiated by the office of the president of state resumes, Kabylie will be paralyzed by a general strike similar to that in 1980, except that the actions to be carried out will have a peaceful aspect. In the face of such a situation, the government has a duty to live up to its responsibilities. The dialogue must also be concerned with this calmly and peaceably presented issue.

Higher Food, Fuel Prices Reported

95AF0001C Algiers EL WATAN in French 18 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by Yacine Abdelkrim: "Milk, Fuel Price Increases"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The price of milk went up by almost 28 percent yesterday. And today there will be new increases in the price of fuel. The price of high-octane gasoline at the pump will rise from 8.50 to 9.50 dinars [DA], while the price of regular will go from DA7 to DA8.20. For its part, diesel oil will cost 50 centimes more.

In the case of milk, the price of a liter of pasteurized is up from DA5.50 to DA7, while 500 grams of the same product in powdered form now costs DA50 instead of 36. For its part, milk for infants is up from DA26 to DA36. The price of a bottle of butane gas has been increased by DA20.

Although unexpected by consumers, these new price increases had been scheduled by the Ministry of Commerce. Officials in the Price Directorate are presenting them as measures aimed at effecting a noticeable reduction in the gaps separating prices from real costs.

All the more since some of the products in question, such as milk, are imported. Sources at the Ministry of Commerce even point out that considering its cost, a liter of milk should be selling at from DA15 to DA16. These price increases were scheduled to take effect at the start of summer, but in order to keep in step with the timetable for the economic stabilization program, the government departments were forced to go ahead and implement them.

Despite all that, officials are taking pains to assure public opinion that these recent increases, which are part of the

economic stabilization program drawn up and submitted to the international financial institutions, will probably be the last ones this year.

The reason is that the amount of financing for subsidizing essential products—and that includes milk—will remain at its current level of DA24 billion, as is in fact provided in the draft finance law for next year.

In other words, there will be no upward revision of prices in the case of flour and semolina. The Ministry of Commerce is at pains to point out that those subsidies are a heavy strain on the state budget. Besides, the problem should present itself in different terms after 1995.

In the case of petroleum products such as gasoline and butane, which are "the object of an implicit subsidy," the price increases are actually a matter of catching up with the real cost per barrel and the exchange rate. This measure is also part of the terms set by the IMF.

With respect to the increases in question, the Ministry of Commerce continues to be much more concerned about the behavior of big speculators than about that of households. Disruptions of the market can only come from the former, who are capable of stockpiling thousands of boxes of milk in order to engage in price speculation.

Social Conditions, Security Situation 'Intolerable'

95AF0001B Algiers EL WATAN in French 19 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by M.T. Messaoudi: "Increases"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Algerians today are literally caught in the crossfire. On the one side are the terrorist assassinations and acts of sabotage that are being tragically suffered and experienced. On the other is the rising cost of food products. For most Algerian families, social and economic pressure and the deterioration in security conditions have gone beyond the threshold of what is tolerable.

That is the tragedy of daily life. Not only for those who experience the agony of terrorist violence in their own flesh but also for the increasingly numerous fathers and mothers who wind up in the red at the end of the month. The prices of essential items have been increasing at a frantic pace, especially since the Sifi government implemented the IMF conditions imposed in connection with the structuring of the Algerian economy.

Flour, semolina, milk, fuel, and other widely consumed products are now partially subsidized by the state.

Those products, which are imported using hard currencies, end up in the black market more often than they do on the shelves of supermarkets. The "strategy" of shortages being pursued by the black market barons with the complicity of certain cadres in the public administration forces households to spend two or three times the official

price of what they buy. As for the "truth in prices" that is so dear to the current government, it makes no sense unless it leads to growth.

At present, however, it changes in step with the inflation rate, and the trend does not indicate any economic improvement whatever. On the contrary, disinvestment and the flight of capital are making an already very precarious situation worse. And it is the most disadvantaged classes that will bear the burden.

RSF Protests Banning of LE PATRIOTE

95AF0002F Algiers EL WATAN in French 26 Sep 94 p 5

[Article: "Reporters Without Borders Protests 'PATRIOTE' Ban"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The international organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has raised its voice, in a letter to the president recently made public, against the interdiction of the newspaper LE PATRIOTE "by Algerian authorities." "According to the information in our possession, no official explanation has yet been issued justifying this measure," said Robert Menard's organization.

PATRIOTE, an Oran weekly, was banned on 4 August by decision of the Ministry of Justice.

Though its publication had been approved by the Oran prosecutor's office and the Ministry of Communication, the second issue of the journal never appeared. "We are convinced that the measure taken against us was demanded by third parties disturbed by the tone of our publication," said Mr. Abdelmalek Ouasti, general manager of the PATRIOTE. He told the press the decision was a "judicial error."

The newspaper's management appealed the decision to the Ministry of Communication, which replied, in a 12 September 1994 letter, that the ban did not emanate from anywhere in that ministry. Mr. Ouasti also appealed to the directorate of civilian affairs in the Ministry of Justice but got no reply. RSF, in its letter, described as "arbitrary" the procedure followed by government agencies and judged "unacceptable the authorities' silence on the reason for the ban." RSF adds it is the responsibility of the authorities to inform PATRIOTE's management of "the reasons for this measure and the transgressions of which it is accused." In its first issue, which was sold on the kiosks, PATRIOTE published articles on officers and NCOs formerly with the French Army and a virulent editorial on what it called "phony democrats."

Addressed to Liamine Zeroual in his capacity as president of the High Security Council, the RSF letter was sent to several international organizations. Recipients include the International Press Institute, the International Human Rights Federation, the International Federation of Journalists, the Fund for Free Expression, Amnesty International, UNESCO, and Article 19.

Journalists, Publishers Persist Despite Threats

95AF0001A Algiers EL WATAN in French 13 Sep 94 p 1

[Editorial by Omar Belhouchet: "Press Under Pressure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The press in Algeria is going through a terrible time. Added to the almost permanent death threats being issued by the armed Islamic groups are all sorts of difficulties caused mainly by the malfunctioning of the sector in question.

But even more serious today is the paper shortage that is looming very seriously on the horizon, especially as far as the press in the central part of the country is concerned.

It is true that the authorities have been trying for the past two months, through regular consultations with publishers, printers, and the Ministry of Communication, to sketch out solutions to problems that have been dragging on for many long months, but that is hardly enough.

The economic, technical, and commercial conditions causing problems for the sector have now been largely overcome. One has the impression that the "do-it-yourself" attitude is what dominates the world of the press, which needs some new approaches based on transparency and the rigorous approach. It seems to us that there is a total absence of strategy, consistent thinking, and specific objectives.

Freedom of the press in Algeria has made undeniable progress, and it is now an indispensable component of political, economic, and social life.

To accomplish that, the authorities, in their capacity as regulators, need to encourage the appearance of new rules of the game that will enable the various partners to work in a stable commercial and technical atmosphere.

As regards the threats and other intimidations of all kinds, journalists and publishers have already proven their determination, and they intend to continue the fight for freedom of the press in Algeria.

Press Reporting Said Hampered

94AF0280B Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Sep 94 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Journalists Under Heavy Constraints"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Algiers—"The press in Algeria? Do we still have one?" This bit of sarcasm from the owner of a newspaper sums up the bitterness and confusion prevailing today in most of the country's editorial offices. In the space of eight or nine months, thanks partly to an escalation of terrorist activity, editorial staffs have melted away like snow in the sun. A weekly like ALGERIE ACTUALITES, which formerly employed more than 120 people, now scrapes by with a permanent staff of only a dozen or so. And by no means is it alone in its predicament.

Journalists, "the few who remain," rarely get out of their offices: Travel, hence any actual reporting, is taboo. This is hurting circulation, which has already declined by one-third, in some cases by one-half, from a year ago. And the heavy-handed censorship enforced in the name of "security" (see LE MONDE of 30 June) has made the journalist's profession even riskier.

"Political violence and insecurity are the number-one problem. And this is precisely where our margin for maneuver is most restricted," says one young editor. "We have the 'choice' between disseminating official communiques from APS or printing 'scraps of information' thrown to us by the security services and their allies when it suits their purposes. But it's impossible to publish our own news, for example the testimony of a young man whose brother was allegedly tortured by the security forces."

Invisible War

For the overwhelming majority of journalists, effectively cut off from what is really happening in Algeria—from what Cassandras across the political spectrum are calling "the second Algerian war"—that war remains invisible. Salima Ghezali of the weekly NATION asks: "What is a fact? And how should it be treated? To give big play to a GIA [armed Islamic group] threat is to risk turning it into a 'fatwa'. Disfranchised youth in the slums might interpret such 'virtual news' as marching orders."

GIA radicals recently renewed their "warnings" to the press, which they accuse of serving as handmaidens to the regime. In the last year, 18 journalists have been killed by acts of terrorist violence. By way of comparison, some 43 teachers have been killed—but the teaching profession is much larger, and more publicly exposed.

Salima, who has two children from whom she has been separated for many months for security reasons, has moved out of her apartment, as have almost all her peers in the capital. "I received the first threats in January, in my hometown of Khemis-el-Khechna (about 30 km east of Algiers)." Anonymous telephone threats: "You hear a tape-recorded message with verses from the Koran, the ones that call on the faithful to prepare themselves for death. It's devastatingly effective!" she says, putting on a brave smile.

Since returning to the capital, Salima has roomed at five or six different places. With the telejournalist's sardonic sense of humor, these new migrants refer to themselves not as migrants but as "jumpers." They take flight, like grasshoppers, at the slightest alarm, at every new threatening telephone call. "In the end, we feel like lepers," sighs Salima. She is one of the few journalists who has not taken to signing her articles with a pseudonym: "My name is practically all I have left. For me, hiding it would be like putting on the hidjab (veil)!"

Footnote

¹ A 'fatwa' is a judgment handed down by religious authorities. In the wake of the Salman Rushdie affair, it is often considered tantamount to a death sentence.

Medea Described as Town Held Hostage

95AF0002C Algiers EL WATAN in French
26 Sep 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by special correspondent Lyes Abdelmalek: "Medea: Between Resistance and Resignation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Patient and fatalistic, Medea is suffering in silence, hoping for better days. An outsider, on first approaching the town, feels a sense of uneasiness, an indefinable "malaise" that only further accentuates the strange calm that weighs over the almost deserted boulevards. A heavy torpor envelops the town. But the day is still young...

Medea—Fortunately. When school starts or ends, in these early days of autumn, a noisy joy fills the avenues and grounds surrounding the ancient schools of "Hadj Hamdi" and "Beldjebes." The children here, like those in Ketitene, M'Salah, and Theniet El-Hadjar, don't care about terrorism. They simply ignore the threats of the people who want to prevent them from gathering in a courtyard or sitting in a classroom to listen to the teacher's lecture.

Partly because of their love for Algeria, a love they openly express. Recently the young scholars at "Benzouche," seeing "djounoud" from the ANP [People's National Army] take up positions around their school, rose up to give their own special salute to those who had come to protect them, shouting out: "Tahia El-Djazair, Tahia El-Djazair!" Their meaning was clear: "Let us stay in our school. Leave us in peace to study. Go have your war somewhere else."

But doubtless it will take more than the shouts of Benzouche's pupils—other clamors, and other cries—for the terrorists to understand.

Last Saturday, those criminals burned down a high-school in Merdjehekir, a residential area overlooking the town. Certainly it was not the first act of sabotage, nor perhaps will it be the last. But despite all the wanton attacks against educational establishments, the schools opened as usual this fall.

Despite the large number of schools, colleges, technical training centers, and high schools that have been burned down, local authorities have spared no effort to ensure that the young scholars are not penalized. Except in Robaia, a commune in the southern part of the wilaya, where a CEM [college of intermediate studies] was completely consumed by flames, virtually all the schools that have been "hit" have been repaired, and in record time.

It was the same with the "Khadidja Benrouissi" girls' secondary school, which local officials managed to open on time despite the fact it had been twice attacked by the terrorists.

However, despite the repeated blows Algerian security forces have struck at the terrorists, the population continues to suffer the indignities inflicted by the armed bands that infest the region. Owners of kiosks and vendors of newspapers and cassettes are among the first to reject the diktat imposed by the "criminals and sons of harkis [Algerians who served with French forces during the war of independence]" in the name of who knows what religion. For more than three months now, no newspapers have been sold.

Residents of Medea must often wait for buses to stop in hopes of "relieving" a few passengers of their newspapers, which are passed from hand to hand until they are in tatters.

A kiosk owner who was sympathetic to the dissolved FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] and naively thought he could continue to sell Arabic-language newspapers despite the interdiction was "fined" 10 million centimes, after being harshly roughed up.

Another townsman, a wage earner and head of household, was hit with a "fedya" of 3 million centimes for failing to make his monthly "contributions." Thus Medea live in a state of anguish and paranoia, always subject to the "hogra" of the "fools of God."

It is an especially difficult time for those folks who are scared to go anywhere except by taxi, or afraid to leave the markets in their own quarter to do their shopping, even though prices of fruits and vegetables are much lower elsewhere. "The whole place is under a curse." There have been many assassinations. And since the most recent terrorist attack—the target was a young gendarme who was buying up supplies to celebrate the birth of his first child—inhabitants do all their shopping in their own quarter, regardless of the extra expense.

By no means, however, does this mean the town has surrendered to the killers. Far from that. And even though it's no Igoudjal, the town can boast its own acts of heroism and resistance. People still talk about the muscular "reception" a young merchant in Emir Abdelkader square gave to the four terrorists who "descended" on him.

Throwing a punch at one and kicking another, the young merchant succeeded in forcing his attackers to flee, despite the bullets he took. Then there was the old mujahidin from Ain D'heb who, observing the goings and comings of a suspicious character, went to fetch his gun. Lying calmly in wait for the killer, he fired three shots at him before aiming at the knees to foil his escape. "The terrorist was carrying a small-caliber pistol. As soon as he saw it, the mujahidin realized he couldn't be hit at a distance greater than 20 meters. He let the young

guerrilla empty his pistol before shooting him in the leg. As he lay bleeding in the road, the green recruit had the temerity to tell the veteran of the liberation war: "I am a mujahidin!" The story has been carried far and wide. So has another one, recounting the assassination of an APC [People's Communal Assembly] orderly three or four days ago. The man, who lived outside the city limits and was the father of a soldier, roared like a lion in the face of the "killers of the night" who had come to demand his son's whereabouts. "You band of hooligans, you dirty vermin! You really think I'm going to tell you where to find my child?" And passing from words to action he threw a tremendous punch at the man pointing a gun at him. But he was alone and unarmed, and his assailants numbered four or five. The father paid the price of his courage: He was felled by a bullet fired point blank into his heart.

Is Medea a village held hostage? A martyred town? Not at all. Medea is simply waiting for this wave of insanity to pass, so it can begin once more to live in the peace and tranquility for which it has always been noted. Medea, a historic shrine, proud of its past, its traditional arts, its fertile land, and its imams—Cheikh El Fodhil Skander, Cheikh Mostefa, and Cheikh Bendali—who would never have countenanced the activities of these latter-day terrorists who style themselves "mujahidin."

EGYPT

Impact, Consequences of Female Circumcision Story Noted

Egyptian Press Exploits Story

95LD0002A Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 28 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by Sa'id Sunbul]

[FBIS Translated Text] It was the Egyptian press that broke the issue of the CNN television program showing a circumcision operation performed on a 9-year-old Egyptian girl.

The Egyptian press accused the American television network of intentionally defaming Egypt and distorting its image before the whole world through the program.

The international network's main office in Atlanta noted that the Egyptian press had published and assigned a group of senior officials to travel to Cairo to investigate the matter and clear things up.

Two evenings ago I met with the members of the group. It was headed by Ted Turner, the network's number-three man. Gail Young, the network's Egypt correspondent, was with them. Gail recounted the circumstances of the program's broadcast. She said: "I have worked in Egypt for the last four years and have fallen in love with Egypt. No one who loves Egypt would think of defaming her."

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"The custom of female circumcision in Egypt is one of the subjects I thought of presenting. By the way, it is a subject that was raised before the Population Conference. I relied on an Egyptian girl whom I paid \$300 for photographing a circumcision operation. The photography then took place. The Egyptian family demanded no money: it was happy about the girl's being photographed during the circumcision. They asked for a videotape of the program that had been photographed."

Gail Young added: "The program throws light on the custom of circumcision. It shows how it takes place in an inhumane manner, but it does not defame Egypt."

I disagreed with her about this opinion. My opinion was that the program defamed Egypt and wronged the Egyptians. I added that there is an accepted tradition that one should not photograph children if they suffer torture, rape, or even mistreatment. Gail said, "It was the Egyptian press that published the girl's name and the name of her family!" I said, "Rather, it was the television program that repeated the girl's name several times. Not only that, the photographer's lens captured her face while she was lying in bed writhing in pain."

Ted Turner said that they are in the process of producing another program about Egypt to correct the misconceptions. He again stated that Egypt is an important and influential country: they have absolutely no interest in defaming Egypt and are eager to maintain good relations.

I maintain that the wound to the Egyptian child was a wound to every home in Egypt. Certainly the international network reviewed its broadcast in the wake of the campaign mounted by the Egyptian press and discovered that Egypt did not deserve to be wronged in this way. It sent this group to set matters right and to maintain its credibility before the public.

Physician Places Story in Cultural Context

95LD0002B Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
2 Oct 94 p 6

[Article by Dr. Mustafa Ruslan: "Female Circumcision: Custom, Science, and the Television Scene"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The showing on the American CNN television network of an Egyptian girl being circumcised by a barber-surgeon so angered and disgusted many people and official Egyptian circles that the public prosecutor has investigated the young woman student at the American University who was said to have been behind the shooting of the film.

I wish to present some points of psychology and social psychology that may be useful to us in this important case.

First, female circumcision is an African custom widespread in the Nile River countries. Sudan is the country that practices it most. In Egypt the custom becomes more prevalent the farther south we go. In Cairo it is

widespread in popular districts with a population of immigrants from the countryside. This does not prevent the custom from existing also in highly educated circles that have nevertheless maintained their customs and traditions, misguided as these may be.

The origin of the custom from the point of view of cultural psychology is the mistaken belief in a causal relation between sexual desire and the external genitals that are wholly or partially removed by circumcision. The family therefore believes that by means of such surgery it is protecting the daughter from the danger of sexual misconduct by eliminating sexual desire.

This is a cultural, not a religious belief. As for the view of science, it is completely different. Sexual desire arises in the mind—the brain—not the genitals; then the genitals complete what is called the psychosexual cycle. It has been found that some women—not all—who have this operation suffer disturbances in this cycle, but not in sexual desire itself. We can therefore deduce that removing these external parts does not remove sexual desire, correct its behavior, or prevent misbehavior. The opposite is possible: namely, we may be faced with a woman who has complete sexual desire but does not have her psychosexual cycle. The result will be psychological and social problems.

Second, the woman student who scandalized us by this program has raised an important psychological issue in Egyptian society—fear of scandal. This is the opposite of what happens in Western society in general and in American society in particular, where the media and scientists search for weak points and internal problems and constantly expose them to stimulate the discovery of solutions to them. We have not become accustomed to this procedure because of this collective and individual fear of scandal. With regard to this case, I think we should not be much absorbed by interest in scandal, defamation, or the unwarranted claim that the issue may affect tourism. As some have noted, the important point in the affair is that instead of pillorying the young woman student who scandalized us we should study the problem of circumcision in all its dimensions. The Health Ministry should sponsor a law criminalizing this inhumane operation. The Information Ministry should undertake a program to raise the consciousness of Egyptian society, which believes in and carries out the operation openly to the accompaniment of shouts of joy—an operation that leads to potentially tragic problems.

Immediate Reaction to Film Presented

95LD0002C Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
23 Sep 94 pp 14-17

[Article by Buthaynah al-Bili: "Female Circumcision: Is Anger Enough, or Is There Really a Problem?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the second day of the Cairo Population Conference, the American television station

CNN broadcast a film that aroused Egyptians' feelings no end. The documentary began in the home of a simple person in Cairo. To maximize the sensation, the station paused a few seconds to advise those with weak hearts not to watch the next shots. Then the picture focused on a young girl named Najla, no more than 12 years old, crying anxiously in a closed room. In a few seconds the film's action began. Two men rushed into the room, lifted the girl's legs, restrained her movements, and removed her undergarments. Then a third man arrived with a knife and cruelly cut off part of her female organs. Blood gushed out. Its color mixed on the screen with the filth of his hands.

Some Egyptians considered what had happened to be an act of rape. Others were filled with feelings of disgust at the Western media and their eagerness to capture the conditions of the poor of the East to entertain and arouse the West. Some stood in the middle on the ground that what was happening was part of reality—the reality that most of the common classes in Egypt still practice female circumcision.

Although those who saw the film were a minority of Egyptians, a state of anger swept through people. Some balked at the filming of the operation. The others preferred to go to the root of the matter, circumcision itself. In either case there is a problem.

The latest scientific studies show that 73 percent of girls in Cairo undergo circumcision. The percentage rises to 95 percent in villages and hamlets. Some 3,600 female circumcisions are performed daily in Egypt. Doctors perform 40 percent of them; barber-surgeons and other nonspecialists perform the rest.

The following report will give the facts about circumcision: its causes and circumstances, the legality and illegality, and its negative effects on women and men, especially sexual frigidity among wives and drug addiction among husbands.

Barber-Surgeon "Dies"

After the film was broadcast, most barber-surgeons in Cairo disappeared from view, so that it became virtually impossible to conduct a newspaper interview with any of them. We asked about the best known barber-surgeon in the Sayyidah Zaynab neighborhood. The reply was practical. His family claimed he had died, though all the people of the neighborhood insisted he was still alive.

It was the same picture in the Imam al-Shafi'i neighborhood, though the tactic was different. After the residents described the shop of one of the circumcisers to us, we were surprised to discover that everyone sitting in the shop denied having anything to do with male or female circumcision. Someone unintentionally let drop the comment: "The circumciser—they took him to jail."

In the midst of it all there was strange movement taking place around us. "Circumcision," said the owner of the store, "used to take place in the past, but it does not take place now."

Most of the barber shops in the area were closed for no evident reason. We asked the owner of a kabob shop. "Don't tire yourself out," he replied. "The entire area is 'incapacitated.' Every barber has hidden his tools and stopped practicing for a time." Beside him was a woman customer who listened to my question. "Come with me," she said, "and I will take you to Hajj So-and-So. He's a clever man and has practiced the profession for a long time." Outside she asked me, "Do you have a daughter you want to have circumcised?" "No," I said, "I am a journalist." She said, "Here in the Imam al-Shafi'i group circumcisions of girls and boys are done at the Friday market." Then she asked me, "Are you for or against circumcising girls?" I said, "I am supposed to be asking you." Without hesitation she said, "I am for circumcising girls. The proof of the matter is that 'God loves those who cleanse themselves.'" [Koran 2:222] I tried to explain to her the difference between "those who cleanse themselves" (*al-mutatahhirin*) and "those who are circumcised" (*al-mutatahirin*). She said sharply:

"Are we European foreigners? O.K., foreign women are lax. We are Muslims. I had my two daughters circumcised a week ago. A girl has to be circumcised when she is big—unlike a boy. I myself was circumcised by the same barber, because he is skillful and we have known him from generation to generation. Sometimes, when the girl is grown up, we call him and he comes right to the house."

By this time we had reached the barber's house. We found it shut, but the woman did not stop. She accompanied me to the back door of the house and went in to talk to the barber's daughter. As time dragged on, I broke in on their conversation and said to the daughter, "I want to talk to your father." She said immediately, "Daddy is not a circumciser." I gave the woman a meaningful glance. The girl continued, "If Daddy were a circumciser, he would be in prison by now because the police have arrested all the circumcisers."

I asked her, "Why?" She said, "Because circumcising girls is a mistake." I said, "Why does Daddy do it?" She said, "Daddy refused." The woman standing next to me intervened excitedly at this point: "Don't say 'mistake.' Circumcising girls is necessary. And do you know what? You're still a girl and don't understand anything."

Wedding Night

Anxiety and fear have gripped the neighborhood, now that being a barber-surgeon, which used to be practiced publicly and with full confidence, has become a crime like drugs.

An ordinary woman vender pulled me by my clothes and said in protest, "Why don't you want girls to be circumcised? To us in the country this thing is a great shame. If a bridegroom consummating a marriage finds that his wife is uncircumcised, he calls the midwife immediately, and she must be circumcised before he will consummate the marriage with her. Circumcision protects girls'

honor. Should we let them become loose women? You should write that female circumcision is a duty. We are Muslims, aren't we?"

A 30-year-old woman junior high school graduate with three boys, who asked me not to mention her name, said to me, "If I had a girl, I would not subject her to this cruel operation. I shall never forget the day my mother sent me to a doctor who operated on me without anesthetic. I was in grade school. I felt unbearable pain. Alas, I am still paying the price of the operation. Now that I have fallen in love and married, I still feel that I am unable to satisfy my husband, because I personally feel nothing. My husband often scolds me and blames me about the kind of circumcision that was performed on me—as if I were responsible. Usually I have to trick him into believing that I am sexually willing. Believe me, I am living a real tragedy. So I wonder why most mothers insist on doing the same thing with their daughters although they know the results very well."

Circumcision of the Angels

Strangely, some girls in the popular quarters do not undergo the circumcision operation. They are saved from it in a strange way—something that common folk call "circumcision of the angels." This means that the girl is circumcised without having an operation. I asked a doctor in Shubra who specializes in this. He said that the difference between a doctor who performs this operation and a barber-surgeon is great: the doctor considers it merely a cosmetic operation and cuts off small parts, sometimes merely making a wound on the girl. The barber, on the other hand, excises any external part. Sometimes a young girl's organs are extremely delicate, so that any surgery will harm her. We therefore say that the angels have carried out the circumcision operation on her. It is clear that most people are eager to have the operation performed on girls as a kind of celebration of their approaching the time of maturity.

For his part, Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman Nur-al-Din, an internal medicine and endocrinology consultant states that although the majority of doctors have stopped performing this cruel operation, a few doctors still agree to do it because of people's demand for it, especially in the countryside and Upper Egypt. One should note that female circumcision is not limited to Muslim girls; some Christian families still practice it, especially in Upper Egypt.

One can say that female circumcision derives from a pseudoscientific idea handed down uncritically for generations in Egypt: that the nature of our country's hot climate increases the degree of desire among girls and that the amount of sexual arousal decreases greatly after girls are circumcised. Circumcision in the south of Upper Egypt and in Sudan is therefore done in a very cruel way: all the external female genitals are removed. This naturally leads to immediate complications during the operation, such as hemorrhaging, which can lead to

the girl's death. There are other complications over the long term, such as external lesions, chronic inflammations, and so forth. All this is because of the extremely high temperature in these regions—if we are in the realm of comparison—for in the Egyptian countryside in the Delta only a small part is removed during the circumcision operation.

The Pharaohs

This happens despite the fact that this cruel operation is alien to Egypt. Examination of Pharaonic mummies has demonstrated that [female] circumcision was unknown in ancient Egypt. No one knows how the custom crept into our country, particularly since circumcision among the Jews was not practiced on girls, but was limited to men as a symbol of belonging to God's chosen people—and similarly in Islam and Christianity. It seems that the custom of female circumcision came to us from the south, because it was an ancient custom deeply rooted in Ethiopia before the emergence of Islam.

[Al-Bili] All the same, there are doctors who specialize in circumcision and small offices and clinics that openly perform it. What measure is needed to deal with them?

[Dr. Nur-al-Rahman] I think the doctor who agrees to perform this operation is the same as one who agrees to induce abortions. The criminalization of the latter requires the criminalization of the former. There actually is a law forbidding female circumcision. Unfortunately, it is not enforced. These people have to be punished with full rigor. The physician's union should play a clear role. Circumcision consists of removing part or all of the clitoris, along with part or all of the labia minora (what the common folk call "the two leaves"). Excision of these parts reduces a woman's sensations and her capacity to respond to the man. This leads to disturbance in the relation between the husband and wife. Feeling that his virility is deficient, the husband turns to taking drugs as a way to overcome the wife's frigidity. Many studies have established the connection between drug use and female circumcision. Furthermore, the wife feels a sense of frustration and inferiority because she cannot satisfy her husband or herself.

Dr. Husam Badrawi, professor of gynecology at Qasr al-'Ayni Medical School, likewise thinks that female circumcision is a criminal act that has no religious or scientific basis or clear origin. Yet it is carried out cruelly and openly although it destroys the girl's feeling in her genitals in a way that affects her behavior as a future wife and mother.

The philosophy of circumcision in popular quarters is based on the idea that circumcision protects a girl from sexual arousal resulting from her body's rubbing against her clothing and prevents her from responding to men. This is nonsense. The process of sexual reaction begins in the brain. The external organs have another role. We ought to change people's attitude toward this bad custom to stop it and punish those who engage in it.

No Provision in Islam

The Grand Mufti of Egypt, Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, thinks that no decisive authentic text concerning female circumcision has come down, although some Prophetic traditions concerning it have been passed down—traditions categorized as "weak" by experts on the authenticity of traditions. One scholar has said, "There is no benefit to be derived from circumcision and no *sunnah* to be followed."

Clearly, the decisive word on female circumcision should be spoken by those who have knowledge—the medical specialists. If they say that female circumcision ought to take place in a certain way, then their statement should be welcomed. If they say it is best to stop circumcising women, we must follow that opinion.

As far as I know, most Islamic countries—such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Morocco—do not carry out female circumcision. If there were a decisive text on the matter, these countries would not hesitate to enforce female circumcision.

[Al-Bili] But how can this custom be opposed in Egypt?

[Dr. Tantawi] It must be opposed through scientific progress and enlightenment. A girl's chastity does not depend on her circumcision, but on good upbringing and her understanding of religion and morals.

[Al-Bili] Doesn't preaching play a role in this?

[Dr. Tantawi] Undoubtedly, advice and guidance by scholars and others will have the effect of clarifying the provision of Islamic law on the question of female circumcision.

[Al-Bili] Is it permissible to enact a law criminalizing female circumcision?

[Dr. Tantawi] There is no objection to the government's passing laws forbidding the operation except by a qualified physician—this if the opinion of trustworthy physicians is that the operation involves benefit to women. If they think otherwise, there is no objection to enactment of a law forbidding it absolutely.

Christianity Does Not Recognize It

Archpriest Irmiya Labib Bishay, the priest of St. George's Church in Imbaba, says that there is no clear provision in Christianity mandating female circumcision. The matter involves outworn ancient traditions that see a woman's not being circumcised as arousing her sexually and jeopardizing her honor and that of her family.

We hold that sin does not arise only from the impulses of the body; rather, as the New Testament (James 1:14-15) says: "But each person is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own desire. Then desire when it has conceived gives birth to sin; and sin when it is full-grown brings forth death." Therefore, sin does not occur

because of the full endowment that God has created. The organs that are considered ugly have greater honor, as is mentioned in Genesis: "God created man sound"—that is, complete.

Archpriest Bishay added: Pope Shenuda in all his sermons and teachings always expounds this matter and explains that the teachings of the Church do not stipulate female circumcision. Bishop Serapion is overseeing education on this subject by holding conferences and issuing many publications on it. These conferences are usually held by the priest of the church along with a physician, so that religious thinking can be complemented by sound medical thought.

[Box, p. 16]

Basic Elements of Crime Fulfilled in Female Circumcision

Judge Salah Mahmud 'Awis, deputy chairman of the Court of Appeals, spoke about the criminal and civil responsibility involved in female circumcision. He said that violation of the human body is considered a crime, whatever form it takes, whether it occurs intentionally or as a result of negligence and lack of reflection.

Under the Egyptian penal code intentional crime depends on three elements:

1. a material element consisting of outward physical conduct emanating from the criminal,
2. a moral element consisting of the will to commit the act and produce its results,
3. a legal element consisting of the existence of a provision in law criminalizing such behavior and setting punishment for it.

If these elements are fulfilled, criminal and civil responsibility for the act ensues even if there is no deterrent penalty.

The circumcision operation is based on violating the female's body by wounding. The female is thereby deprived of a natural part of the reproductive system that God created for a wisdom and end that He comprehends in His knowledge. The act of wounding takes place with the volition and intention of the doer of the deed, with the young girl's parent or legal guardian (whether father, mother, grandparent, or legal guardian) as his accessory.

By virtue of this legal description of the act, the operation of circumcision should be considered a crime of intentional wounding to be punished under sections 241 and 242 of the criminal code according to the period of treatment.

[Box, p. 17]

Circumcision in the Revealed Scriptures

Among the Jews: Circumcision among the Jews has symbolic value. It is an expression of a covenant between God and Israel attested by blood. Israel's prophets called

it circumcision of the heart. One should note that among the Jews circumcision means male circumcision.

In Christianity: Circumcision was practiced in the initial period of Christianity, but the apostles rejected it and the Church did not adopt it. It remained only among the Ethiopians.

Among Muslims: The scholars of Islamic law are of three views about circumcision. The first view is that it is obligatory for men and women; the second that it is traditional practice (*sunnah*) for both; the third that it is obligatory for men, but not women.

The argument of those who hold the first view is the Prophet's saying: "Whoever becomes a Muslim, let him be circumcised." The Prophet also said: "Women of the Ansar (Medinan Muslims), dye your [hands] by immersing them [in henna]; be circumcised, but do not excise entirely: beware of ingratitude for benefits."

The chain of transmitters of these traditions has been challenged. Indeed, Ibn al-Mundhir holds that there is no authoritative tradition or *sunnah* to be followed concerning circumcision.

The argument of those who hold the second view is the Prophet's saying: "Circumcision is *sunnah* among men and a noble action among women." The chain of transmitters of this saying has also been challenged.

The majority of scholars agree that the question of female circumcision should be discussed on the basis of knowledge of the functions of the organs in order to determine the status of female circumcision in Islamic law and its social effects. The science of the function of the organs sees this organ as sensitive and as aiding to complete the process of fertilization. Cutting it off and excising it retards sexual climax. Some social scientists therefore think that circumcision is a cause for the spread of drugs in the country, because the husband, reaching his climax before his wife, feels that the act is therefore deficient and causes pain for the wife. This may lead him to dislike her for her frigidity. Some scientists go further and say that hashish and opium abuse will be eliminated when female circumcision is eliminated. Women will then be normal, and men will be normal and not need these substances as aids. Science therefore believes that circumcision harms conjugal life and leads to the spread of narcotics among men. If all this is true, dealing with the matter is very easy. Women who are not circumcised have nothing to worry about. As for those who are circumcised, this organ should not be excised from them. If [female] circumcision is prohibited in Egypt, as it has been in some Islamic countries like Turkey and North Africa, no harm will be done. God is the One who guides to the right way.

ISRAEL

Europeans Said To Rebuild Weapons Infrastructure

95AA0001A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
30 Sep 94 pp 9-11

[Article by Ben Kaspi: "Here Is How Saddam Husayn's Death Lobby Operates"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Four years after the Gulf war, Saddam Husayn was supposed to be defeated, starving, and lacking any military capability. In fact, Saddam Husayn has yet to renounce his dream of heading an empire controlling weapons of mass destruction by means of which he can force his insanity on the world. The "death lobby," the secret purchasing system that fed the Iraqi war machine, has been completely restored and is operating energetically to get things back on track. Within a year, according to estimates in Europe, the sanctions will be lifted from Iraq, and many firms are rushing to grab a good place in line. Among them, shamelessly, are even those firms that operated up until the Gulf war in the service of the Baghdad terror regime. Here is how the Butcher of Baghdad's comeback campaign is going.

Next January will mark four years since the Gulf war, the war that broke the military might of Saddam Husayn, that turned Iraq into a leper state, and that was supposed to put an end to the Iraqi dictator's dream of turning his country into the "Prussia of the Middle East."

Four years of international boycott, isolation, near famine. In their wake, Saddam Husayn has ceased to be the world's headache, leaving that honored function to his neighbors the Iranians.

Not exactly. The results of research conducted by MA'ARIV show that it is still too early to mourn the Iraqi ruler. Saddam Husayn has not learned his lesson. His ambitions remain what they were—to become a regional power, to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and to take control of Kuwait and expand beyond.

According to these findings, Saddam Husayn has succeeded in restoring his secret purchasing system. This system, nicknamed the "death lobby" in the West, is what built the Iraqi war machine, fed Saddam's mass destruction weapons factories, and almost equipped him with an atomic bomb.

The system is made up of an endless number of Western firms and technology plants, liaison people, secret merchants, and middlemen. It has been resurrected, it functions, it feels good. The present system arose on the ruins of the previous one. It includes almost all the firms and plants that worked for Saddam in the past. None of them, it turns out, has learned their lesson.

It has been assumed that the sanctions and the international boycott of Iraq will be lifted within about a year (we will come back to that). On that basis, the Iraqis are promising those same firms and plants astronomical contracts, cheap oil and generous payment terms—as soon as the sanctions are lifted. The temptation is enormous.

Last week a jury in Richmond, Virginia convicted a Jordanian citizen who managed to circumvent the international boycott and send tens of sensitive technology shipments to Iraq from the United States. The man,

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known in the United States under the name of Al-Harb, is 'Abd Al-Qadr Muhammad Abu Harb, 31, the son of Jordanian businessman Na'im Abu Harb.

Na'im Abu Harb, the father, holds a powerful post in the Jordanian Government. He lives in Rabat-Amon and controls five large companies: The Sahar Group, The National Qali Plant, The Industrial Consulting Group, Arch Commercial Corporation, and Arch Consulting. According to thousands of documents confiscated from the home of the younger Harb and from his warehouses in Virginia, he managed last year to send tens of sensitive technology shipment from the United States to his father's various companies in Rabat-Amon.

Customs investigators eavesdropped on Harb's telephone conversations, tracked him, and recorded and photographed his activities. On the basis of the evidence gathered against him, Harb was convicted on 12 counts of the indictment, at the end of a trial that lasted five months. During the course of the trial, the prosecution revealed the sophisticated purchasing system that Harb had set up in the United States, by presenting numerous documents. Among them, exchanges of secret messages between Harb, from his home in Richmond, and senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad. MA'ARIV has obtained copies of those documents.

American federal investigators are convinced that shipments of technology and sophisticated equipment that Harb sent to Rabat-Amon were intended, in the final analysis, for Iraq. The investigators exposed a large number of communications between Harb and Dr. Na'im Abud Al-Jaburi, who serves, among other things, as the director of the trade branch of the Iraqi Governmental Electric Company.

The documents show that al-Jaburi passed special requests for sensitive equipment regularly each month to Harb, at his home in the United States. Among other things, the investigators found a complete technical diagram of the Iraqi thermo-electric plant "Al-Musayb," that Al-Jaburi had sent Harb.

Al-Jaburi, it turned out in the investigation, asked Harb to begin purchasing spare parts and technology for this plant. "Al-Musayb" is one of Saddam Husayn's main plants involved in ballistic missile technology. The investigators believe that Harb also purchased technology and equipment for the "Al-Hilal" electric plant, the focus of Iraqi activity in the area of nuclear research.

The Circuit: From Jordan to Iraq

Last year Harb succeeded in transferring a lot of equipment to Iraq, including chemicals, valves, delicate pumps, accelerators, and sensors—almost all the equipment that Saddam used to purchase before the war. This equipment helped him build the Iraqi war machine, including missile plants and plans for ABC armament.

The scope of Harb's activity was relatively small, on the order of some 2 million dollars a year. But American

customs agents believe that the Iraqis have many more "Harb clones" in the United States. The Harb investigation brought home just how sophisticated and persistent the new Iraqi acquisition system is. Harb operated, it turned out, not just within the confines of the United States.

Thus, for example, he sought to purchase sensitive measurement sensors from the Japanese "Horiba" plant. "Horiba" supplied Iraq such sensors before the war, which served Saddam Husayn's mass destruction weapons industry. This time the "Horiba" people refused Harb the merchandise, even though he told them it was intended for Jordan. The Japanese did not believe him, rebuffed three separate requests of his, and were convinced that the merchandise was intended, in the final analysis, for Iraq.

Harb did not give up. In the end he succeeded in acquiring the requested merchandise via a network of straw firms that made contact with one of the "Horiba" suppliers, and they managed to get what was asked for. Harb was likewise successful on the issue of chemicals. He sought to acquire chemicals from the Dutch "Azki" firm. But this time they rebuffed Harb's requests, for the same reasons that the Japanese "Horiba" plant had given.

Documents seized from Harb showed that, in the end, he succeeded in acquiring the requested chemicals. At this stage it is not clear from just whom he got them, but the shipments went out and reached their destination—Baghdad.

Abd al-Qadr Abu Harb will be sentenced at the beginning of November. The cessation of his activity will have no influence on the new Iraqi reequipment campaign. Harb was nothing more than a small fish relative to the overall Iraqi activity. Harb's father Na'im holds a more central position in the Iraqi acquisition system. The father has extensive contacts in Iraq and controls, in addition to the five Jordanian firms, many other international corporations: in Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, and other places.

All of Na'im Abu Harb's companies are involved in international commerce. Most of them operate in countries that have a common border with Iraq. The investigators suspect that Na'im Abu Harb, via his network of firms, functions as one of Saddam Husayn's main suppliers/middlemen.

In the course of the trial of his son, Abd al-Qadr, the son claimed that all of the technology that he shipped was intended for Jordan and did not go beyond Rabat-Amon. To prove that claim, his lawyers presented certificates that his father sent from Rabat-Amon, from Jordanian customs, including a certification that the merchandise stayed in Jordan.

MA'ARIV has acquired the findings into this matter conducted by an independent American body: The

investigators, who worked in Rabat-Amon, discovered that the customs supervisor who signed those certificates, in fact works out of the offices of Na'im Abu Harb and works for him. "People like Abu Harb, who enjoy power, contacts and money, can do whatever they want," a source close to the investigation told MA'ARIV. "They have no problem with bribery to get certificates and signatures from any governmental body in any Arab country. The money takes care of everything and with it they can get everything."

Tom Madigan, the customs agent who investigated the younger Harb, wrote in a document that he submitted to the court: "In the course of the investigation, I reached the conclusion that Iraq is pursuing an aggressive strategy, the purpose of which is build weapons of mass destruction as quickly as possible."

American customs is now investigating at least another 12 American firms suspected of supplying technology and products to Iraq, in violation of the sanctions. Private individuals suspected of managing this trade are also under investigation.

At the same time, similar investigations are under way by the American Department of Commerce, focusing on attempts by Iraqi agents operating in the United States to smuggle ABC products and technology.

"A lot of effort is being invested now in the Iranian and North Korean directions," an American customs source said, "but we still run into a lot of Iraqi incidents. In some of these incidents, the same agents who are purchasing for Iran and North Korea are also working for Iraq."

The main Iraqi activity is not in the United States, in which there is close supervision of commercial activity relative to other Western countries. The Iraqis focus, as they always have, on Europe.

Recently Britain was rocked by the "Swansea Incident," during the course of which two Jordanian citizens were caught who had forged British customs seals for printing forged EUC certificates. EUC is an acronym for End User Certificate. Such documents are required every time sensitive technology is exported from one country to another. The document certifies, on government authority, who the "end user" of the merchandise is and constitutes a guarantee that the sensitive merchandise will not get into foreign hands.

The suspects, Jordanians of Iraqi descent named M.T. Hishmati and al-Samuri, set up a company called Swansea International and dealt in the forgery of "end user documents." With the aid of these forged documents they were able to import sensitive equipment and technology via their company and submit a British government certificate to the effect that they were the end users.

After exposure of the incident, British customs was forced to reprint all its certificates, to change its seals and

to add additional devices and signs to prevent similar forgeries in the future. Hishmati and Samuri managed to escape and were not brought to trial. The investigators believe that they found refuge in Jordan.

A similar incident happened to the United Nations. The special committee for overseeing the sanctions imposed on Iraq prints special certificates allowing Iraq to import emergency goods in the areas of food and medicine. These letters are required for the shipment of merchandise of any kind to Iraq.

UN people recently revealed that unknown persons have been duplicating those letters and using them to forge "clone letters," that they sell to companies exporting prohibited merchandise to Iraq.

In March, in Stuttgart, the German Hans Jekel was caught with a large quantity of plutonium in his pouch. MA'ARIV has learned that the names of three contacts were found among Jekel's effects: an Iranian, a Libyan and an Iraqi.

The Iraqi was identified as Muhammad Abd al-Hadi. The German authorities know him as a heroin dealer. According to intelligence information, Abd al-Hadi was supposed to get the plutonium from Jekel.

"Ever since the Iraqi reactor was blown up by Israel, Iraq has not had a plutonium project," a source close to the investigation told MA'ARIV. "Therefore the question is: Why does Saddam Husayn now need quantities of plutonium?"

By the way, the Bulgarian firm Kintex is behind all the quantities of plutonium and uranium seized recently in Europe. This company, which belongs to the Bulgarian Government and deals in armament, technology and trade, was the firm that worked with Saddam Husayn and scientist Gerald Bull on the "super cannon" project. The involvement of Kintex in this activity proves to investigators that this is not a question of occasional, haphazard shipments by private entrepreneurs trying to make money, but an organized activity, initiated and backed by real money.

In addition to the Iraqi purchase activity, the West is also worried about the increasing number of meetings between senior Iraqis and people from large Western firms. Generally this involves firms that supplied technology to Iraq before the war and are trying to assure their slice of the cash pie even before sanctions have been removed.

"It is simply amazing," says an American investigator, "that exactly the same firms are returning to the scene of the crime and doing it in public, shamelessly. The people who supplied Saddam with ABC technology intend to return to their evil ways immediately after the removal of sanctions and are already signing deals now."

Thus, for example, people from the Italian firm "Ansaldo-GIE" met senior Iraqis in Rabat-Amon last

April. Present at that meeting was the chairman of the company, Giuseppe Alfredo. "Ansaldo" was the company that supplied ovens and other sensitive components for the Iraqi nuclear program before the war.

Last year "Ansaldo" was involved in a new scandal, that was exposed in the Italian press after the same merchandise was seized for Iran. Since last April "Ansaldo" seniors have met at least twice more with senior Iraqis.

'The Historic Mistake'

American and Western intelligence sources are convinced that many more firms—most of them among those that supplied Iraq in the past—are already now in contact and negotiations with Iraq. Particularly striking in this area is the activity of German firms. The Iraqis prefer the Germans because of their historic cooperation and the fact that the Germans did not actively participate in the Gulf war.

Examples: the "Siemens" company and the "Benz" company (the diesel unit) have long been in close touch with the Iraqis.

Additional European firms: the French "Thompson" corporation (that specializes in the areas of radar and telecommunications), the French oil company "ELF", the British "GPT" corporation and the "Alcatel" company. And this is a very partial list.

"They all sense," says a source in the Pentagon, "that sanctions will be removed very soon. And they all want to be there when it happens."

Over the last half year the Iraqis have gone on the offensive, meeting with all their Western allies in an effort to muster as much support as possible for the removal of the sanctions. Tariq Aziz, Saddam Husayn's personal envoy, is directing this campaign.

Kenneth Timmerman, the author of the book *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq*, claims that the French interior minister, Charles Pasqua, is assisting the Iraqi efforts with all his might.

According to Timmerman, Pasqua's personal aide recently said the following: "France made a historic mistake in supporting and participating in the coalition against Iraq. The time has come to go back to our historic ally in the Gulf, to Iraq."

Last October, Timmerman reports in an article that he wrote this week in the *WALL STREET JOURNAL*, Aziz visited Paris and met with French Government seniors. The visit bore nice fruit: The French invited all the heads of the Iraqi oil industry to Paris for a summit meeting to be held in April.

Furthermore, the French promised to rebuild the Iraqi oil plant in Nahr Umar. Shortly after Aziz's visit, a delegation of 28 directors of large French firms left for Iraq (like, for example, Citroen, Renault, Alcatel, Schneider (the French electric company)). The members

of the delegation discussed many projects in Iraq, among them the reconstruction of chemical plants.

The Iraqis' liaison man with the French delegation was Gen. Umar Rashid al-Ubaydi, the head of the Iraqi branch for military industry.

In the wake of the French, as we said, the Italians and Germans now also sense what is going on. Representatives of tens of Italian and German firms are pouring into Rabat-Amon and meeting there with senior Iraqis.

They Secretly Sell Oil

Where does the money come from? Even now, still before the removal of sanctions, Saddam does not seem to be suffering from a lack of cash. "He has no money problem," says an American source. "There is no lack of banks that will grant him credit on the basis of good times soon to come." Many banks lend Saddam credit "against" frozen assets that will be thawed with the removal of sanctions. That is the case, for example, with the French "Banque Credit de Lyons".

Nazmi Hawtchi, a multimillionaire Iraqi banker, is one of Saddam's main money people. From his base in London he intercedes and arranges meetings between senior Iraqis and the heads of Western firms. That was true of the meeting between the heads of the French oil firm "ELF" and senior Iraqis in Rabat-Amon. By the way, also present at that meeting was a Jordanian very close to the head of the Jordanian Government. The man is very active in interceding and arranging commercial contacts and actively assists the Iraqi supply channels that operate through Aqaba and Zarqa, on the way to the Iraqi border.

Saddam gets additional money from the illegal sale of oil. The newspaper *SHARQ AL-AWSAT*, published in London, reported at the beginning of the year that Iraq had managed to set up two straw companies, in Rabat-Amon and in Cyprus, that secretly sell Iraqi oil.

According to intelligence information, one of the companies recently succeeded in completing an Iraqi oil sale deal worth \$360 million. At the same time Iraqi oil minister Safa Habubi is meeting with heads of large Western oil companies. The list even includes American corporations that thereby violate the American law prohibiting meetings and contacts with Iraqi companies. The Americans serve as intercessors and envoys in order to establish continuous contact and negotiations with the Iraqi oil heads, so as not to be caught far from the pie when the sanctions are removed.

"The coalition that removed Saddam Husayn from Kuwait, is facing a tough choice," writes Timmerman in his article, "whether to continue the sanctions until Saddam is really defeated or to remove them and thereby declare Saddam the big victor in the Gulf war."

SAUDI ARABIA

West Seen Imposing Values on Other Nations

94AE0174B Medina AL-MADINAH in Arabic
14 Sep 94 p 3

[Editorial: "War of Values, Behavioral Uniformity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Both the International Conference on Population, which ended its work in Cairo on 13 September 1994, and the imminent American invasion of Haiti in the Caribbean raise questions about whether an age of imposing values has already begun or is about to begin!

The draft of the population conference's final document might contain several articles that clearly try to impose the values of the victorious West and wealthy North on the vanquished East and poor South.

They wrote the document with special social values and connected them with the religious and cultural heritage of every people. Is it not a fact that the attempt to codify principles of a social morality (international) is of itself an expression of a fierce international crisis, since generally accepted principles are established by social, political, and legal scholars. In reality, the more the body of legal principles in any society is expanded in order to codify the principle of morality, the more that is of itself proof of a moral crisis. The bases of morality should not be legislated and cannot drive a penal policy pertaining to the fundamentals of hospitality, for example, or principles of social graces.

However, the new world order has jumped to attempt this, surrounded by dangers. It ignores the fact that diversity of social and religious values and cultures is one of the sources of human wealth, and that the attempt to impose "behavioral uniformity" on the world's peoples in accordance with the standards of the industrialized West is an attempt that is doomed in advance to failure. This is not only because it is sharply incompatible with the requirements of logic and the nature of things, and not just because it would result in poverty of human wealth and denial of cultural identity of specific peoples on earth, in a clear attack on the most prominent of human rights, but also because this behavioral uniformity, which is intended to be imposed on everyone, is a failure socially and on the humanitarian level. It is marked by family degeneration, an unprecedented crime rate, and a large increase in suicides, not to mention diseases that doctors still are unable to treat, such as AIDS for example.

A jump from Cairo where the attempt was made to impose social values by an international organization on the rest of the international family, to Washington where there is an attempt to impose political values through the use of armed force on a small Caribbean country, might seem to be of considerable difference and an undesirable comparison. However, the desired object in both cases is

to impose values. The first is social, cultural, and religious, while the second case is political.

Democracy, or respect for people's choices, might appear to be a natural, acceptable pursuit, but the stimulus—in the case of Haiti—is that the ruler who is to be installed by warships is a person whose ability to rule is suspect by Washington itself. The evidence is a secret report, issued by the CIA. The ruler whom they intend to depose by force is no worse than the examples of Duvalier and Baby Doc, who enjoyed Washington's protection for a quarter century. The only difference that Haiti is experiencing is not the result of the policies of a military gang that has been in power since 1991, but rather it is the result of the policies and errors of the rulers who preceded that gang since the American occupation of Haiti, from the beginning of the century to the early nineties.

It is clear, then, that the triumphant West has chosen in the Cairo document and in the Caribbean to be the sole doctor to diagnose the case as it sees it through its values and not through its eyes. It considers any other diagnosis to be inaccurate and unacceptable. It monopolizes prescribing the medicine and, at the same time, thinks that the only medicine is what it prescribes.

This happened in Cairo with the strange concept about population, that the solution to the development crisis is found in anarchy. It also happened in Haiti with the strange concept that the Haitian crisis was caused by the absence of Aristide, whose mental powers are dubious, and that the solution is Aristide's return. His ability to run the country in accordance with democratic methods is also suspect.

Population Issues Viewed

94AE0174C Medina AL-MADINAH in Arabic
14 Sep 94 p 4

[Article by Nuwwaf Mash'al al-Sabhan: "Propagandists for Westernization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the issue is neither new nor modern, the differences of opinion about certain matters and issues included in the agenda of the International Conference on Population clearly and completely point out the division between two directions in the Arab world. They are the thrust towards adherence to the Arab Islamic identity of the ummah [Islamic community as a whole] as opposed to those who see the Western culture, for example, as a civilization that should be imitated.

We would like to identify each direction, so as to illustrate clearly the differences of both. The first trend, which raised its voice in rejecting the principles of the population conference sponsored by the UN, is first and foremost an expression of a religious and national position. It rejects the thoughtlessness behind the culture of an era that oppresses by force of propaganda, not by force of ethical values. This trend seeks to express the Arab Islamic identity and to defend it against any

cultural attack, even if it is clothed in the guise of science or political wisdom, or intellectual liberalism.

The other thrust has been dazzled by Western culture and seduced by its writings. The adherents of this movement think that this culture is the solution to overcome the problem of backwardness, and that entering the modern age will only be done through its gates even if this calls for abandoning many of the forms of special identity, including certain religious values that they see as impediments to progress and development!

The debate over the population conference between the two sides made perfectly clear the direction in which the propagandists of Westernization are going. They see in the opposition to the population conference an expression of the backwardness vis-a-vis the West! They tried to depict the opposition as nothing more than traditions without logic, proceeding from a fossilized position incapable of change no matter how positive the reasons.

Mistakenly, they tried to attach importance to the fact that the religious national movement rejects the population debate in sum and detail and that the opposition came because the conference is supervised by the UN, since it suspects that this organization implements Western policy in its entirety and has turned into a tool in the West's hands. What comes from this organization is unacceptable regardless of its validity or not. Words such as these—as we shall see—circulated by propagandists of Westernization have no basis in fact. They are aimed at placing suspicion on the national religious movement that opposes Westernization and rejects falling under the influence of another culture even if that culture is prevalent.

These deceptions are clear and blunt. The rejection was not for the population conference as a whole. The objection was not to the conference discussing this world problem, but rather the most vehement opposition was to certain issues that were seen as obvious interference in the affairs of others, an attempt to impose a direction on them and on their values, religion, and heritage. In that, we are guided by the statement issued by the Board of Senior Ulema in Saudi Arabia. That statement contains the clearest proof that the opposition was not merely based on traditions, but rather it was based on religious principles. The corrupt intent of this conference is proved by specific ideas discussed and articles referred to [by the ulema]. They relied on texts after a deliberate reading of the document that was written to be the basis for discussion.

The position of opposition to the population conference was not based on a political position, but rather stemmed from the concept that everything aimed at affecting the basis and principles of the religious and national identity is categorically rejected. However, the proponents of Westernization, and those who have adopted the West's culture, do not see the value of these bases and principles. They always want to put on the European hat and pipe to stress their culture and progress.

For such events as these, the propagandists for Westernization always take the occasion to cover up their feelings and exuberance for Westernization. They try to use certain issues to pass on what they believe in and impose these beliefs on others. In politics, for example, they see nothing wrong with abandoning Arab rights in exchange for peace. This is their point of view, rationale, and superior realism. With regard to culture, they find nothing harmful in smashing community values in the name of progress. In ideas, they see nothing injurious about destroying religious and ethical invariables, and in every other area they pursue whatever violates the creed, heritage, and values so long as—in all of this—the adherents of Western culture benefit.

We are not hostile to Western culture. On the contrary, we respect it. We respect its civilizing and scientific accomplishments. We want to benefit from the scientific aspect especially. This does not clash with what we reproach the proponents of Westernization for. They do not want to interact with other cultures; they are trying for complete surrender, to take it over in its entirety, as though we were a community without a culture, history, or a deep-rooted human heritage. The desirable interaction with Western culture is not to take everything it produces and apply it en toto to our society and lives. There are vast differences that do not permit us to be Arabs armed with a Western identity. This would mask our identity and destroy our culture.

There are some propagandists for Westernization who are embarrassed or afraid to reveal themselves openly. We find them criticizing from afar, without explanation. They say that many of those who opposed the conference did not read its document and were content only to hear about it. To them we say that the statement of the kingdom's senior ulema, who are the most important ulema, was issued after studying the document and gaining complete knowledge of its contents. When a board with this weight and importance gives its opinion, we must respect and value it. After that, we need not listen to the arguments of the proponents of Westernization, nor their inferences clothed in the garb of science and brilliant ideas spreading intellectual larceny.

Steps to Privatize Petrochemicals Lauded

94AE0174A Medina AL-MADINAH in Arabic
14 Sep 94 p 6

[Article by Amin Muhammad 'Abd-al-Karim: "Significance of Privatization in Petrochemicals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Every day Saudi economic policy proves its immense wisdom with new dimensions and numerous indications of its success. It sheds light on its decisionmaking ability in striving to develop the available potential of the Saudi economy by opening new fields and vast horizons for the purpose of growth and development of economic policies. This helps the economy avoid crises that afflict the world economy and drives the Saudi economy from success to success. Last

week the Saudi Cabinet issued an historic decree to strengthen and develop petrochemical industries by opening the way for corporations and private investors in this field and to give national capital the opportunity to participate in strengthening that industry. This will be done in order to develop the petrochemical industries by equally supporting the intermediate and final industries that depend on petrochemical materials in their processing, through attracting investments from Saudi and foreign individuals and corporations.

The fact is that this matter has several aspects and multiple objectives. We all know the extent of the vicissitudes experienced by world oil markets as well as markets for petroleum byproducts. They are suffering severe fluctuations, and we cannot continue in this fashion without attempting to overcome them. An attempt must be made to find a local solution in order to protect national products. The decree seeks to create an ambitious plan aimed at increasing sales outlets for the products of major Saudi companies within the country, in an attempt to stabilize prices and protect our products from fluctuations and whims of world markets for oil products, their derivatives, and integrated industries such as petrochemicals. Introducing national capital and investment in this field means that new companies can be found to work in this area along side the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation [SABIC] or integrated companies. This also means that new areas will be opened. The necessary markets must be found to retail

those products, and the only way to do that is through the local market. We all know that the Saudi market is large, open, and capable of absorbing more petrochemical products. This would change the local market into a principal consumer of petrochemical products and, thereby, save the Saudi product from the world fluctuations. The matter is not confined to this alone, but rather the decree is aimed at exporting surplus petrochemical products to world markets in large quantities. This would mean that Saudi products exported abroad would contribute to restoring price stability in world markets. For example, raw plastic is a petrochemical product, and we know that there has been a big increase in prices of raw plastic in world markets. This would mean the entry of local factories into world markets as a source of that material. This of itself would create the kind of price stability desired.

It is true that opening petrochemical industries to privatization is a wise and successful decision in all aspects, because this decision was well-thought-out in all its facets. Positive reactions have begun in response to this wise decision, since several foreign companies have declared that they warmly welcome this decision and are preparing for it by conducting economic feasibility studies with regard to establishing plants and successful projects in the kingdom. The Saudi economy always proves its ability to develop and adapt to world changes with a wise and ambitious plan.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghan Islamic Parties, Power Divisions Discussed*94LA0243A Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 15 Aug 94 p 12*

[All quotation marks as published]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Preface

Division of power is one of the most important political issues of every society. In other words, the division of power is the most crucial problem of societies, and the crisis in Afghanistan, as well, has its roots in the division of power. This article intends to examine the issue of power, the process and its direct criteria, and the necessity of national power, which we shall deal with through research, descriptive and historical methods, and reference to sources.

It should be pointed out that should we fail to state the realities frankly or avoid mentioning them, we shall not achieve desired results. It is necessary before speaking about the division of power and the criteria offered in this connection to define the issue of power, identify its various types, clarify examples, and then respond to the theory of whether the division of power in the form that has been set forth so far conforms to the national power needed by the society.

The Issue of Power and Its Definition

Power is the gravitational center or the main core of research and study in political science, and according to some scholars politics means power. Power, like other terms in social sciences, has various definitions. In this article, we shall point out the definition of power that is closely connected to the discussion at hand, and we shall examine it in its material and spiritual dimensions.

Power consists of: the potential and capability of carrying out one job and, in connection with individuals and groups, the imposition of will and domination of one over another. Another definition states that power is "having material resources and forcing others into obedience." But the issues of influence, credibility, and documentation are among the manifestations of spiritual power, to which unfortunately little attention is paid in our present situation.

But domination is another sort of material power that manifests itself in the political structure of our present groups. Domination indicates the superiority of material power, such as weapons, money, and guns; whereas public opinion awaits the documentation and credibility of individuals, which is not gained through propaganda. Rather, documentation is the result of the efforts of individuals, good reputation, dignity, and their useful operation.

The Political Movements of Afghanistan

Discussion concerning the political power of the Islamic parties of Afghanistan is one of the key issues to which little attention has been paid. Discussing this issue is important since the political power of political parties is a preface to national power in the society, and before everything else, the question is raised as to whether we have political parties based on scientific and academic definitions.

Although raising this question is bitter to certain friends, we are obliged to recognize well the political movements of these possessors of real power, because it is these very political movements in the society that have taken charge of the affairs and so far have been unsuccessful in creating national power and rule in the country. These political movements are not only the cause of the problems in the country, but it is certain that they are one of the major causes of the crisis in the country. Hence, it will be helpful to mention a few issues concerning the political movements in Afghanistan in order to solve this problem.

1. Most unfortunately, today many of the groups have regional, racial, and ethnic biases and, under the influence of an ethnocentric climate, are caught in the narrow circles of ethnicity, race, and language.
2. Recently, attraction to groups has decreased greatly, and the leaning towards parties has reached a minimum.
3. Disunity among parties is expanding, and the various branches of parties do not act in harmony. Organizational stability has disappeared, and many of the leaders have no control over the movements under their command.
4. Rather than thinking of expanding their influence throughout the country, party leaders have increased their dogmatism daily and have forgotten the ideas of country, nation, and national spirit.
5. Parties and groups do not believe in the principle of public participation and only continue their existence by resorting to armed force.
6. Today in Afghan society, a silent majority exists called the people, who have sealed their lips out of fear of guns, tanks, and airplanes and are burning internally.
7. The political movements of the country act with disregard for public opinion and no evidence is seen of an attempt to reform their ways. This group of parties and political movements in the country cannot be called representatives of the interests of the nation.

Considering the above, it can be said that the political movements of Afghanistan lack the characteristics that qualify political groups as "political parties." The political movements of Afghanistan cannot be called political parties. And this is while our society has had political groups. A political society requires political organization, and political organization also requires thinking

political forces. We must maintain our distance from the military organizations and move towards political organizations, or we must reconstruct the existing organizations for national power and national rule to be achieved. Certainly, political parties will have no problem in the structure of the political system, because both are political phenomena.

Military organizations have been unsuccessful in creating and establishing a political institution called a government or national rule, which is the most important political institution in the arena of the country and nation. The experience of Afghanistan and other countries proves this claim.

It must be admitted that the formation of political parties is a prelude to national power, and while we lack national power we must suffer in the chaotic market of politics in Afghanistan, suffer calamities and endanger the lives, property, and honor of Muslim people. It must be said that "national power" is a power that protects national security, guards political independence and territorial integrity, and preserves the unity of the nation and the values governing the society.

Unfortunately, Afghanistan at the present time lacks such a power. It is proper to raise another question. What are the effective factors in creating national power and how can the void of national power be filled?

In order to respond to this question, we shall take a look at the politics of power. The theory of the politics of power always looks at the effective factors of power. Without a doubt, the theory of the politics of power is a pioneering theory in social sciences, without which we cannot examine the political characteristics of the society in a country and nation.

The American geographer Spikeman and Rudolf [Steinmer] and Hans Morgenthau have certain theories in connection with the effective factors of national power. Here, we shall only refer to the views of Hans Morgenthau and avoid a lengthy discussion.

Hans Morgenthau considers the following factors as the foundation of national power:

1. Geographic situation
2. Existence of national resources
3. Industrial capability
4. Military readiness
5. Population
6. National characteristics
7. National spirit
8. The quality of diplomacy

Considering the above-mentioned effective factors in the creation of national power, it can be said that Afghanistan has the best effective factors of power. Afghanistan has the most sensitive geographical situation in the region. In terms of water, soil, and land, Afghanistan has the best geography and manpower. Afghanistan has the potential capability for production and excavation of

underground resources, which can be tapped. Technology can be brought to Afghanistan, and farming and animal husbandry can be encouraged. This country has many potential and practical capabilities. The roads of Afghanistan are at the present a target of attention by the world. But, unfortunately, none of the above-mentioned factors have been used in connection with achieving national power. With a contemplative look, one can say that the Communist regimes in Afghanistan were unable to create national power from the various factors that create power. The puppet regimes, in the course of their rule, only dominated one geographical part of the country. They could not make use of the existing natural resources; the production capacity declined to a minimum; the army of Afghanistan disintegrated; much of the population of the country either migrated to other countries or took positions in the trenches of the holy war; people were deprived of national identity; the quality of diplomacy declined to zero; administrative and government offices were confined to the center of a few cities; and Islamic ideology and morality in which the majority of people believed was harmed severely. Universities and scientific centers were closed; the thread of government organizations tore apart; and finally what was left of the past regime or what was transferred was destructive military technology and its accompanying hardware. Also, the militia were Communist gun carriers, traitors to the nation and Islamic honor, and the perpetrators of great crimes.

But the Mojahedin, at the start of the transfer of power, before thinking about national power in guaranteeing the security of the lives, property, and honor of the people and preserving the lofty values of the holy war, demanded the division of power. In other words, they demanded that what we did not have be divided. Now, we shall review the process of the division of power and criteria offered in this connection, since the meeting of the advisor.

The Process and Criteria in the Division of Power

1. Division of power on the basis of the share of the group.
2. Division of power under the federal system and making the political regime of Afghanistan federative.
3. Division of power with attention to the share of Shiites in the Cabinet and accepting Shiism in the Constitution.
4. Division of power among the four rival groups (Islamic Society [Jam'iat-e Eslami], Islamic Party [Hezb-e Eslami], Islamic Unity Party [Hezb-e Wahdat-e Eslami], and Northern Movement [Jonbesh-e Shemali]).

1. Criteria in the division of power on the basis of the share of the group. This division, which was noted prior to the transfer of power and in the climate of Peshawar accepted two criteria in the division of power as most essential.

A. The legitimacy of the combative groups and their being Islamic in the division of power.

B. The quality of the organization (material and spiritual capability of the parties in this connection).

In this division, the nine parties were divided into three groups: Large groups and parties with numerous bases and more resources, medium groups and movements, and small groups with limited resources.

In this division, the positions of president and prime minister as well as key ministries belonged to the groups in the first category and, in accordance with the agreements, large groups each with a share of three ministers in the Cabinet, medium groups with two ministers, and small groups with one minister in the Cabinet.

It is noteworthy that in this division, only nine holy war groups deserved this share, the "seven-group coalition of Peshawar and two Shiite groups." But in the last session, in which the final decision in Peshawar would be taken to transfer power and determine the criteria for the division of power, the two Shiite groups, that is, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Unity Party, were not present. Perhaps under the influence of foreign politics the presence of Shiites in this meeting was prevented. But in commenting on and examining this criterion, it can be said that the criterion of the holy war legitimacy of the groups was not observed in practice. The militia and the remnants of the previous regime, who did not have a place in these divisions, gained an active share in the division of power. For example, the Uzbek militia, and at their head "Dostam," was supported by many groups, and we witnessed "Dostam" called a Mujahid, at another juncture a general, at another time deputy minister for defense, and finally he found a place in the coalition of the holy war parties. Secondly, the accepted criteria were never observed in practice, and the spirit of cooperation was not developed among the members.

2. Criterion of division of power on the basis of geographical division under the control of the federal system. This criterion in the division of power was suggested by the forces of the north, that is, the National Movement, and some of the other groups also supported it. In fact, attention was paid to changing expansive rules to federal rules. I believe that if the federal system were to materialize in Afghanistan, only the federal system of the north, which enjoys the effective factors of power, such as vast arable lands, proper climate for farming and animal husbandry, a favorable geopolitical situation in being a neighbor to Central Asia, natural reserves and resources, and roads, will gain sufficient profit. However, the federal situation in other regions of the country, should it be achieved, will be meaningfully different from that of the regions in the north of the country, because other regions lack such effective factors, for example, the central regions of Afghanistan, with its mountainous areas, problems of roads, lack of favorable geopolitical situation, lack in practice of favorable conditions for becoming federal. In this connection, if the regions in the

south have the effective factors of power, such as arable land, geographical situation, proper climate, and commercial situation, the materialization of the federal system in these areas will have other consequences. For example, in the creation of the federal system in the south, most of the Pashtuns of Afghanistan will have a share. What will be the role of the other Pashtuns, and what will be the decision of the Government of Pakistan in connection with this argument to preserve the stability of its borders? These are issues that are beyond the realm of this discussion.

3. Division of power on the basis of observing Islamic justice, accepting the rights of the Shiites in the structure of the political system. But in response to the demands of Shiites in the division of power, which was offered by the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Unity Party, several points can be mentioned. Even though this demand was made after the transfer of power, it has a long history and has been an issue as a strategic demand in the course of the political and social life of Shiites. With the presupposition of experience in preventing the massacre during the time of 'Abdol Rahman, the Shiites suggested this demand with consideration for observing Islamic justice, and if this demand was opposed occasionally by some of the individuals with ill intentions, and especially reacted to at the time of the Constitution, never in the course of the crisis did it cause chaos and conflict, because it is a logical and natural demand of a large stratum of the Muslim nation.

4. In connection with the division of power among the four major groups. It can only be asked: Can conflicting and opposing groups be placed side by side, and will the rule resulting from the hostility of several rival groups last? I conclude the commentary in this section.

National Power and Its Definition

The criteria for the division of power to some of which we have made reference raises the question of whether we have the national power we want to engage in dividing. Is the notion of the division of power, considering the tragic situation of the society of Afghanistan, not flawed?

National power is the total of the material and spiritual capabilities that exist in the domain of a geographical and political unit called a country or government. National power guarantees national security; the security of lives, property, and honor; protection of territorial integrity; preservation of Islamic and national values; and finally protection of the unity of the nation. In the opinion of this writer, the society of Afghanistan lacks such an element. I wish the leaders and parties, before discussing the division of national power, would discuss the creation of national power. But, as to what has prevented the achievement of national power, it can be said briefly:

1. The structure of power and the leadership of the military forces has been the greatest obstacle to the

attainment of national rule. Expressing respect for the holy war personalities who served in the course of the holy war and after the transfer of power and rule maintained their sanctity and holy war legitimacy, it must be said that until the armed forces are removed from the organizational composition of the government and avoid interference in political affairs, the problem will remain and gain new dimensions every day. In this connection, I must say that the present situation of our society is reminiscent of the crisis in Egypt during the time of Gamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. Amin Havid, who was familiar with the events at the time, says that lack of alertness at that sensitive juncture resulted in a situation that made finding a solution difficult. Soon a dangerous situation will be created in which the leadership of the army can engage in more extremism in its inclination for power and take up a stronghold in its new position, in which it will dominate everything. If so, personal and group interests will replace national interests. The leaders of Afghanistan can be successful when, with the support of the people, they deflect the military and take the necessary steps to prevent its misuse of power.

It should be pointed out that military power in an organized form, in the form of an organized army, is effective when it is implemented to protect the society from tragedies and calamities due to demonic power and for the preservation of values.

2. Having weapons and material resources is another obstacle to achieving national rule and power. The movements and groups must know that having power is not the goal. Power is a tool for achieving a goal. An idealist uses power to attain a better world, peace for mankind, and humanitarianism.

A religious individual uses power as a tool to move close to God, because in Islamic logic, God is the main possessor of power, and the struggling idealist Muslim brings peace, prosperity, coexistence, equality, and social justice.

Summation and Suggestions

1. The criteria for the division of power have in practice been an obstacle to national power.
2. Parties and groups in the course of wars and internal conflicts have lost their political stability and require political reconstruction and restoration. The society and people require political organization, not military groups.
3. The criteria presented suggest that groups with the most material resources and military weapons must have a larger share in the Cabinet and national power. But, the quality of the resources is not discussed, and resources have not been defined. Does resources refer to those that are procured from the West or the East or those resources that were taken as spoils in the war and holy struggle?

4. The above-mentioned criteria suggest that the rival groups, those who have had the most bloodshed, casualties, and wars among themselves, must have the largest share in the rule. But no mention is made of what must be done to the perpetrators of the war, slaughter, and massacre of the people and destroyers of the national capital and what punishment must be imposed on them.

While criticizing the criteria of power, which in fact must be termed division of poverty, we first have some suggestions and then propose a solution to the crisis in Afghanistan.

1. In order to prevent injustice and the imposition of force in regards to the oppressed classes in the society, we suggest that observance of Islamic justice be mandatory for the participation of individuals, actual and legal persons, in the national power and rule of the country.

2. We believe that Afghanistan and its Muslim people have the best potential and capabilities to build the national power and prosperity of Afghanistan. This national power must be shaped, and in this connection the political participation of individuals, groups, and actual and legal personalities is necessary.

3. For the membership of individuals in the Cabinet, our suggestion is based on the famous reported saying of the Commander of the Faithful, [Imam] 'Ali, who says: Choose leaders who are wise in the knowledge of politics.

A criterion that expresses piety, scientific competence, political knowledge, competence, and expertise. It is not important from which race, tribe, or clan these individuals originate.

Summation

From the examination of the criteria in the division of power, we have reached this conclusion: that our people, our society, and our proud nation want the creation of national power under the auspices of which the life, property, and honor of the homeland is secured. The people of Afghanistan want a powerful political government under whose auspices the lofty Islamic and national values will be preserved, and this government will be supported by the people and obliged to protect political independence and create proper relations between the individuals in the nation. It will act as an Islamic and national thread in the cultural, political, economic, and moral dimensions among the people, and its goal will be the unity of the Islamic nation as the country and nation of Afghanistan.

A Solution for Achieving National Power by Creating a Balance of Power

1. The existing political groups and movements of Afghanistan must be placed in new coalitions and their numbers reduced so that to create balance of power among them.

2. Based on the existing conditions, three coalitions are possible in the process of political actions and reactions.

3. These three coalitions are:

The coalition of the Shiite parties of Afghanistan, including the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Unity Movement of Afghanistan, and two other coalitions among the Sunni brothers in Afghanistan. By achieving these three coalitions, we can approach the creation of national government and power.

Procedures and Necessary Conditions for Achieving These Three Coalitions

A. The coalition of two Shiite groups, "the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan and the Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan."

These two groups, with their common world view, ideology, and religious beliefs, and finally with their common ideals, can create a strong and powerful coalition. If among these two movements there are individuals and elements that create problems for the coalition of these two movements, their number will certainly be small, and they will certainly be unable to stand against the will of the people.

With the coalition of these two, conceivable fighting and the possibility of their situation being taken advantage of by other parties and groups will be prevented. With the creation of a coalition among these two movements, the position of the Shiite clerics, students, and scholars can significantly be used. Also, the coalition of the Shiites in the country can place the whole country in the arena of their political activities and prevent any sort of conflict and escalation of differences.

Two Coalition Movements of the Sunni Brothers

Even though in the mechanism of the formation of each of these two movements of Sunni brothers, tribal, racial, linguistic, and regional biases cannot be ignored, since in the coalition of the Shiites preference was given only to religion and ideology and they were expected to have a coalition under the cover of religious interests, by the same token, we do not accept the criteria of language, tribe, and race as the phenomenon of the crisis. With consideration for the element of religion alone, we suggest that these two coalitions be formed, on the basis of ideological and political common grounds and common operations. The groups of Sunni brothers, who have had coordinated activities in political issues in the course of this period, can have coalitions in the form of two political movements. The decision as to which movement should be placed next to another in a coalition is beyond the scope of this discussion.

Expectations of the Coalition Movements

1. With these three coalitions, the number of decision-making centers will be reduced to a minimum.

2. The balance of power in the social arena will be created in the best form.

3. The grounds for unbridled misuse of power will be removed.

4. With the existence of these three coalitions, wars and conflicts will practically end, the motivation for the elimination of rivals will be eliminated, and power will neutralize power in practice.

5. With these coalitions, leanings towards the nation and service in the national arena will replace leanings towards regions and languages.

6. The role of the leaders of parties and the mechanism of their leadership will change with these coalitions.

— The existing parties and groups needing reconstruction and repair will prosper with these coalitions, and by making use of the experiences of the past, more attention will be paid to politicizing the parties.

8. Certainly, in the process of establishing these three coalitions, the role of the military will decrease, and movements with the concept of the people's participation will be able to guard the interests of all the people in the society.

9. The goal of creating three coalitions is to approach the national power and government of the country and the nation of Afghanistan. In the case of the formation of these three movements, that goal will practically be manifested.

10. The new coalitions, in their political mechanisms and structures, will in practice take into consideration the void regarding experts, academics, and technocrats with the presupposition that their role will be fundamental and certain in the structure of national power and government.

Positive Consequences and Effects of Coalition

These three coalitions will be a prelude to the creation of a political system based on three parties, and these three movements will have the key role in the structure of the future political system, in the creation of government, in the mechanism of national security, in elections, and in creating Islamic and national relations throughout the entire nation. With the creation of these three movements, interference by colonialists will be reduced, and the propaganda of the oppressors will be prevented. With the creation of a political system based on the three movements, in practice the one- and two-party systems will be prevented. This will be the most just political system for Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that this suggestion is made to reduce the crisis and create a balance of power and is a prelude to the structure of the future political system, which is transitional, and in the future, the structure of the regime will be clarified by an Islamic and national parliament of the country.

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INDIA

Refugees Repatriation to Sri Lanka To Resume

94AS0511A Madras *THE HINDU* in English 15 Sep 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Refugees Repatriation to Resume"; quotation marks and names as published]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Madras, Sept. 14. Sri Lankan Tamil refugees staying in the various camps in the State, who have opted to return to their native place, will be repatriated by ship from Monday (September 19) next.

Mr. M. Raghupathy, Principal Commissioner and Commissioner for Revenue Administration as also the State Co-ordinator for Sri Lankan refugees, who announced this here today, said the repatriation of these 7,155 refugees would be completed before October 2.

Totally, there would be nine voyages—four from Madras for the 5,029 refugees who hail from districts other than Mannar in Sri Lanka and five from Rameswaram for the remaining 2,126 who belonged to Mannar district. While the non-Mannar refugees, to be taken by the ship m.v. Nicobar, would reach Trincomalee, those from Mannar would land at Talaimannar by the ship m.v. Ramanujam. This ship would commence its sailings from Sept. 26.

All these refugees had given their willingness (to go back) in writing and no compulsion was exercised over them. As on July 31, there were 68,988 refugees in the 118 camps in the State, of whom 23,446 hailed from Mannar and the rest from other districts of Sri Lanka.

That only a tenth of the total number of refugees in the camps had opted to return testified, Mr. Raghupathy said in reply to a question, that they were not compelled.

He said the Sri Lankan Government had agreed to receive the first batch of refugees in the current repatriation on Sept. 22. A state government official would accompany the refugees and handed them over to the Sri Lanka authorities formally.

The ships taking the refugees would be provided air cover by the naval aircraft and they would be escorted in the sea by the Indian naval and Coast Guard vessels, one in front and the other in the rear.

All arrangements had been made in Madras for receiving the refugees arriving from districts and for their stay. They were given two months' cash doles (Rs. 300) in advance. The state government would bear the cost of their stay in the transit camp at Madras. Already the first batch of 391 returnees had reached Madras, he said.

He refuted a suggestion that the refugees were opting to go back because of the poor conditions in the camps run by the State. Even representatives of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) visited the camps and had certified that the camp conditions were 'excellent'. He said there might be 'deficiencies' here and there but by and large the conditions in the camps were 'really good'. Efforts were made constantly to remove even these deficiencies, he said.

Asked about the complaints that the UNHCR representatives were not allowed to ascertain the willingness of the refugees to return at their camps themselves, Mr. R. Christodas Gandhi, Rehabilitation Commissioner, said it would pose a logistic problem. The verification now took place at the transit camp. It would not be possible for the UNHCR with its limited manpower in the state to visit the camps and ascertain the refugees' views, he said.

Responding to questions about the perception of the refugees in respect of the changed conditions in Sri Lanka, Mr. Raghupathy said there was an impression that things were looking brighter in that country.

Replying to a question, he said he did not find any argument to substantiate the allegation that the Sri Lankan militants' activities could not be completely curbed in the state as long as the refugee camps existed.

Though the number of non-camp refugees in the state was not readily available, he said 1,571 were staying in special camps and if they expressed a desire to return to the Island, they would be sent back.

So far, 1,032 families consisting of 3,575 persons had been repatriated in 1994. After the completion of the present batch, repatriation would resume from January next since the Bay would be rough in the months of October, November and December. He was confident more would like to return. They would now like to watch the developments, he said.

Last year, 2,235 families consisting of 6,926 persons were sent back through seven sailings and in the year before (1992), 8,672 families consisting of 29,102 persons were repatriated. All these persons had gone back to their native places in Sri Lanka, some of them in 'non-cleared' areas.

Electoral Reform Bill Explained

94AS0511D Madras *THE HINDU* in English
15 Sep 94 p 12

[Article by Madhu Limaye: "Electoral Reform Bill"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A lot of misinformation is being published by reputed magazines and journals about the electoral reform Bill that is now before the Standing Committee on Home Affairs. One reason for the confusion is the constantly shifting stand of the Government, and the rapidity with which the Constitution Amendment Bills and the Bills seeking to amend the Representation of the People Acts of 1950 and 1951 are being introduced and withdrawn. The latest Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on June 13, 1994. The Bill that was withdrawn contained a clause which sought to remove the qualification for the membership of the Council of States which Section 3 of the Act of 1951 had laid down. It said that "a person shall not be qualified to be chosen as a representative of any State or Union Territory in the Council of states unless he is an elector for a parliamentary constituency in that State or Territory." The object of the proposed amendment was extremely sinister. It was to enable outsiders to capture the Rajya Sabha seats. This clause ran into opposition from the CPI(M) [Communist Party of India-Marxist] and the government decided not to include it in the Bill.

The Bill that is before the Parliament is not a comprehensive Bill. Its purpose is limited. There is no provision for the simultaneous elections of all representative bodies at fixed five yearly intervals—a measure which would have drastically curtailed election expenditure. There is no scheme for political parties which will require them to hold at least biennial internal elections, allow candidates to be picked up by constituency committees and provide for a disciplinary code based on the principles of natural justice. Nor is there any clause providing for state funding of elections, linked with democratisation of parties, declaration of their sources of income and accounts open to public inspection. It only contains a few miserable provisions aimed at tiding over some current difficulties.

Mr. Jyoti Basu, Mr. Laloo Prasad Yadav and Mr. Biju Patnaik are all at war with the Chief Election Commissioner. Even Mr. Sharad Pawar is challenging the circulars forwarded by Mr. D.K. Shankaran, CEO [Chief Electoral Officer] of Maharashtra, in the name of the Election Commission, which say that the model code of conduct is already in operation in States which will go to the polls in the next six months. Mr. Jyoti Basu has criticised Mr. T.N. Seshan's style of functioning. He wants an ordinance to be promulgated to clip the wings of the CEC [Chief Election Commissioner]. The issue which has upset the West Bengal Chief Minister is not the code of conduct—for he faces no Assembly election—but the photo-identity cards.

The Bill under discussion contains provisions about both the identity cards as well as the code. There are references to the Dinesh Goswami Committee in the discussions on electoral reform in the Press. The report of this committee was neither published by the V.P. Singh Government nor the subsequent Governments. It is necessary therefore to quote from the report the specific recommendation on the identity cards:

"There is unanimity of view among all the members in regard to the implementation of the scheme of issue of multi-purpose photo identity cards. The committee agrees that the steps for successful implementation of the scheme as proposed in para 3.11 of the notes should be undertaken. A time-bound programme for covering the entire country with the proposed scheme is desirable."

"(a) Other Government departments and Ministries should be involved in making the possession of the card by every adult citizen compulsory for receiving benefits and facilities."

"(b) Bhabha Atomic Research Centre should be associated in preparing fuller details of the scheme from the point of view of cheaper cost and its intamperability."

"(c) Active involvement of the postal agencies for covering all areas and making them to serve as the focal point for the field operation connected with the scheme is necessary."

"(d) Provision of adequate funds in the annual budgets of the Central Government and the State Governments to meet the expenditure that is necessary."

"(e) Identifying an agency of the State Government and making it fully responsible for the implementation of the scheme is essential."

"(f) Fixing a time-bound programme for covering the entire country is desirable."

Rule 28 on the identity cards had been in existence for three decades before the Goswami Committee was set up. Nothing was done. Even after the committee's report, no "time-bound programme" was evolved in the last four years. So Mr. Seshan applied pressure to force compliance. The new Bill wants to empower the EC [Election Commission] to decide in consultation with the Centre the manner of the issuance of and the particulars to be included in the cards. The provision (a) will be effective "retrospectively" from January 1, 1960; and (b) will render "void and inoperative" any unilateral notification issued by the Election Commission.

I am not unaware of the complexity of the problems involved, the enormous cost involved, the need for total coverage and the danger of illegal immigrants and refugees securing identity cards through corruption. Nevertheless, the question is why the Governments at the Centre and in the States did not frame any scheme before and even after 1990, despite the consensus in the Goswami Committee on the issue? Can one only or even

primarily blame Mr. Seshan for the resulting confrontation? The object of the new provision, I fear, is not to solve the problem in a phased and effective manner, but to put the whole scheme in cold storage. For this not only the Centre but the Chief Ministers' Conference held in January this year is also responsible. Having said this I must express my disapproval of Mr. Seshan's threat not to hold elections. If the matter goes to the courts, I have no doubt that Mr. Seshan will be overruled, but the Government will also have to take a well deserved rap over the head for inaction.

Another important provision (Clause 16) relates to giving statutory sanction to certain items in the code of conduct. The Government claims that the relevant provision of the new Bill was based on the Goswami Committee's recommendations. But a careful comparison of the Bill and the committee report reveals that one item recommended for inclusion in the statute by the Goswami Committee has been excluded in the Bill. It is important, and so I quote it: "(B) Using Government transport, including official aircraft, vehicles, machinery and personnel in connection with any work relating to elections." The omission is striking and its significance clear. The duty of the Opposition is to get the omitted provision restored. Or do the Opposition-controlled governments also want to misuse governmental machinery and transport?

The Election Commission's circulars insist that the terms "election in prospect" (Goswami Committee) or "imminence of elections" (model code) mean that in the entire period of six months, prior to the expiry of the term of the legislature, during which elections can be held, the model code of conduct would be operative. This is absurd. We are having general elections practically every year in some State or the other. Does it mean that no decisions can be taken and implemented in the States concerned—or at the Centre when the Lok Sabha poll is in prospect? This would be disastrous.

The election process commences when notifications are issued under Sections 14 and 15 of the R.P. Act, 1951, calling upon constituencies to elect members. This is a joint exercise. The recommendation for this purpose has to be made by the Election Commission and the notifications have to be issued by the President and Governors of the States concerned. The new Bill clarifies that the code of conduct will *not* come into operation six months before the expiry of the duration of the Legislature. It will come into force from the date of the notification.

Finally the provision permitting a person to seek election from two constituencies should be amended; it must be laid down that no person shall seek election from more than one Parliamentary and Assembly constituencies at any general election. It is a fraud on the voters. It also creates the possibility of unnecessary expenditure on by-elections. The law should neither encourage the megalomania of politicians nor their pusillanimity.

Tiwari-Yadav Competition in U.P. Described

94AS0511E Madras THE HINDU in English
15 Sep 94 p 13

[Article by Harish Khare: "Confusion in Congress Over Support in U.P."]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] New Delhi, Sept. 14. If the Congressmen in and out of Uttar Pradesh [U.P.] were trying to grasp the significance of the outcome of the impromptu Working Committee that on Tuesday took stock of the situation in the State, the confusion was further confounded by the AICC [All India Congress Committee] spokesman, Mr. V.N. Gadgil's assertion that the Congress headquarters was yet to receive the UPCC [Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee] resolution, passed last Sunday, asking for withdrawal of support to the Mulayam Singh Yadav Ministry. To make matters worse, the U.P. Congress leadership chose to refute Mr. Gadgil's claim.

Indeed, it is becoming clear that the question of Congress support for the Samajwadi Party-Bahujan Samaj Party coalition Government has got reduced to a "Lucknow versus New Delhi" equation. At another level, it has degenerated into a political menage a trois involving the Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, the U.P. Congress chief, Mr. Narain Dutt Tiwari, and the U.P. Chief Minister, Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav.

The Congress central leadership on Tuesday evening was faced with the question whether it could afford to antagonise the pugnacious Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav. The State Congressmen, led by Mr. Tiwari, had already on Sunday indicated in no uncertain terms that they were prepared to seek their political fortunes independent of Mr. Yadav. The Chief Minister, who met the Prime Minister twice on Monday, had to ensure that the Congressman did not ditch him before he was ready to ditch him.

History of Defiance

For Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav the political stand-off between him and the new Delhi establishment is a familiar story. During his earlier chief ministerial innings he had running battles first with the V.P. Singh set-up and then with the Chandra Shekhar/Rajiv Gandhi regime in New Delhi. During that incarnation Mr. Yadav revealed an uncanny gift for defying the big brothers in the nation's capital. In fact, he was the first Chief Minister who sought to reverse the three-decade old tradition of Lucknow, bowing to the better and superior judgment of whosoever ruled New Delhi. After Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant was persuaded by Jawaharlal Nehru to come to the Centre, there was no Chief Minister who could dream of branching out on his own. The rebellion of Hemvati Nandan Bhauguna was short-lived.

And to the extent Uttar Pradesh was central to the dynamics of Indian polity and Congress dominance, Mr.

Yadav's successful defiance during his first chief ministerial tenure set in motion political forces which eventually became less and less amenable to control from New Delhi. So much so that Mr. Yadav can have the satisfaction of having rendered the Congress at best a marginal force in U.P. politics, and by extension a much-reduced presence in the national political equation. Mr. Yadav, who is credited with considerable native shrewdness, cannot be expected to make it easier for the Congress to stage a come-back in Uttar Pradesh.

Mr. Yadav was, therefore, not exactly thrilled when the veteran, Mr. N.D. Tiwari, was asked to take over the reins of the Uttar Pradesh Congress. During his first chief ministerial innings also he had had a few run ins with Mr. Tiwari, who proved to be a formidable adversary. But Mr. Yadav managed—as he is managing now—to impress upon the Congress central leadership that he alone was capable of proving a bulwark against the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party]. In addition, he has appropriated the mantle of the savior of the underclasses in the State.

Strangely enough, Mr. Tiwari also finds himself in the same boat as Mr. Yadav—to the extent the UPCC chief would also like to thumb his nose at those who pretend to call the shots in New Delhi. Like Mr. Yadav those around Mr. Tiwari have also concluded that the so-called central leaders are men with feet of clay. The only difference between the two is that whereas Mr. Yadav can credibly dangle the carrot of a safe Lok Sabha seat before many Central Ministers and leaders, Mr. Tiwari is in no position to give such a vital assurance to the Central busy-bodies.

Mulayam Singh Yadav's Reservation Policy Criticized

94AS0511C Madras THE HINDU in English
15 Sep 94 p 12

[Unattributed article: "U.P. Chief Minister in a Spot"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Uttar Pradesh bandh called by the ruling Samajwadi Party-Bahujan Samaj Party alliance in support of the Government's quota policy was, as could only be expected, marred by large-scale violence causing three deaths and in retrospect it could be said that the entire move was as ill-advised as was totally unnecessary. The Chief Minister, Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav, in sponsoring a State bandh wanted to demonstrate his strength but in the process he committed the mistake of ignoring the political realities. The State Congress(I) had resolved to withdraw support to the Government earlier on the ground that it was against the interests of the people and had even asked for the immediate dismissal of the Government but the high command was not prepared to upset the present arrangement. This has given a breather to the Mulayam Singh

Yadav Ministry although its continuance in power seems to be tenuous given the Chief Minister's uncompromising attitude to the reservation policy in the hill districts. A delegation of BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] leaders too had met the Governor asking for the removal of the Mulayam Singh Yadav ministry. The BJP's complaint was that the ruling alliance in sponsoring the bandh was making a deliberate attempt to arouse caste sentiments and create hatred among the various sections of the people and as such it had no right to be in office any more.

Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav must blame himself for the mess in which his government finds itself today. His rigid stand on reservations in the hill districts which does not seem to be justified by facts and figures and in fact was rejected by the very people for whose benefit the Chief Minister states he wants to implement is responsible for the present crisis. The hill people's representative organisations' plea that since there were no backward classes in their area there was no case for a 27 per cent reservation in educational institutions and for government jobs and, therefore, the State Government should annul the provision seems to be very reasonable. Already violence on a large scale had been unleashed in the hill districts resulting in the killing of half a dozen persons in police firing and there is no knowing when conditions in the districts would become normal given the highly provocative nature of the issue that is the bone of contention. The Prime Minister's appeal to the Chief Minister to take steps to defuse the situation had obviously fallen on deaf ears. Instead of mollifying the ruffled feelings of the people of the hill districts, Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav even went to the extent of categorically asserting that the 27 per cent reservation could not be diluted under any circumstances.

The State-sponsored bandh in support of the reservation policy has further angered them and it has to be seen how the Government is going to tackle the very difficult situation that is fast developing. The State Congress(I) cannot be accused of fishing in troubled waters when it came to the conclusion that the only way out was to secure the ouster of Mulayam Singh Yadav Government. The ruling alliance partner, the BSP [Bahujan Samaj Party], too has been fanning fires of casteism and the statement of Ms. Mayawati who has emerged as the chief spokesperson of the party that even if it meant dismissal of the Government it would stick to the reservation policy in its present form has not made matters easy. And yet it is up to the Chief Minister to weigh the pros and cons of the decision with a reasonable frame of mind and bring in changes that might be acceptable to the people of the hill districts. Especially in the context of the recommendation made by the Government to create a new hill State, the Chief Minister could stay the implementation of the reservation policy insofar as the eight districts are concerned.

Haryana: Assembly Furor Over Criticism of Devi Lal
94AS0511B Madras *THE HINDU* in English
15 Sep 94 p 9

[Unattributed article: "Furore Over Remarks Against Devi Lal"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chandigarh, Sept. 14. Sharp exchanges between the Rashtriya Samajwadi Janata Party [RSJP] MLAs [Member of Legislative Assembly] and the treasury Benches and the postponement of the discussion of the SYL [Sutlej Yamuna Link] Canal till tomorrow were the highlights of the third day's proceedings of the monsoon session of the Haryana Assembly today.

There was furore in the House after the Chief Minister, Mr. Bhajan Lal, while replying to allegations levelled by Mr. Om Prakash Chautala that Ministers and MLAs who were involved in alleged criminal cases or who had come under cloud should clear themselves before the House, said that the former Deputy Prime Minister and father of Mr. Chautala, Mr. Devi Lal, was imprisoned for his alleged involvement in cases of dacoity and attempt to murder.

Mr. Chautala and his colleagues immediately protested to the Speaker that the remarks against Mr. Devi Lal should be expunged as he was not present in the House to offer a personal explanation. The Haryana Vikas Party [HVP] chief and former Chief Minister, Mr. Bansi Lal, urged the Speaker to expunge the remarks against Mr. Devi Lal and let the proceedings go on as per schedule.

Mr. Bhajan Lal could be seen urging the Speaker, Mr. Ishwar Singh, not to expunge the remarks. Initially, in his ruling the Speaker, while mildly admonishing the Chief Minister for levelling allegations against a person not in the House, refused to expunge the remarks. However, later he directed that the remarks against Mr. Devi Lal and Mr. Bansi Lal's remarks of yesterday against the Director-General of Police, Mr. Lachman Dass, be expunged.

The trouble started during zero hour when Mr. Chautala gave a long lecture about morality in politics and referred to the dismissal of Mr. Chhattar Pal Singh from the State Cabinet for his alleged misbehaviour with an airhostess and the resignation of Mr. Anand Singh Dangi on moral grounds after Supreme Court strictures. Mr. Chautala said there was much confusion in the public mind about politicians allegedly involved in criminal or other cases which should be dispelled. He also wanted to know why double standards were being adopted as some Ministers still continued to enjoy seat of power despite reports of their alleged involvement in such activities doing the rounds. In this connection he particularly referred to the Chief Minister and his Finance Minister.

The Parliamentary Affairs Minister, Mr. Jagdish Nehra, charged that Mr. Chautala had no locus standi whatsoever to talk of morality as he had been involved in the smuggling of watches and Mr. Devi Lal had refused to recognise him as his son. Mr. Chautala, offering an

explanation, said that his father had set high standards in public life by refusing to recognise him as his son in case he was proved guilty. But he had been exonerated of the charge and allowed by the Customs to collect the watches after payment of requisite duty. Reacting to this, Mr. Bhajan Lal accused Mr. Devi Lal of being a 'criminal.'

The Speaker also ruled that the appointments or dismissals of Ministers were not subject to the House and thus could not be discussed.

Earlier, the Opposition also flayed the Government for not fulfilling the promises made to the striking Government employees last year. The Chief Minister while rebutting this charge said that the accord between the employees and the Government was being implemented and the genuine demands had already been conceded. He added that about 10,000 ad hoc Government employees had already been regularised.

Earlier, replying to a question by Mr. Ram Bhajan Aggarwal and Mr. Chhattar Singh Chauhan, both HVP, the Power Minister, Mr. A.C. Chaudhary, disclosed that the State Electricity Board is setting up thanas in all the districts to check power thefts.

IRAN

Germany To Assist Building Solar Power Plant
95LA0006L Tehran *KEYHAN-E HAVA'I* in Persian
7 Sep 94 p 10

[FBIS Translated Text] Tehran, 7 Shahrivar [29 August]—The largest solar plant is to be built jointly by Germany and Iran.

KEYHAN's correspondent reports that Engineer Mohammad 'Ali Vahdati, executive officer of the solar power plant, announced the above. He added: Most of the equipment in a solar power plant is like that in a steam power plant, the technology for whose construction our country has already obtained, and for whose utilization it has the required specializations.

Thus, according to what is anticipated in the project's preliminary design, 50 percent of the parts and equipment for the first solar power plant will be built inside the country.

He discussed the fact that the power plant under consideration for Iran will have an auxiliary gas-burning heater. He said: The electrical power produced by solar power in this project will be about 22 million kilowatt hours [kwhr] per year, and if needed 100 to 300 million kwhr of electrical power could also be produced by using fossil fuel.

Engineer Vahdati said the estimated cost of building this plant will be shared equally by Iran and Germany. He said: This task will begin as soon as the German side announces that it is ready and pays the required share.

He added: The project's next scheduled phase, the preparation of the technical specifications and beginning construction on the power plant, would cost \$240 million if all the parts were purchased abroad, but since it is possible to procure 50 percent of the needed equipment inside the country, most of the foreign exchange costs will be reduced or converted to rials.

Continuing, he said: To make it possible to obtain the technology for building the solar power plant, a joint project is already being implemented by "Matan" [as published] experts and researchers for the Academic and Industrial Research Organization to build a solar power plant with a capacity of 200 electrical kilowatts [kw] (725 thermal kw). This project includes the design and construction of a model solar collector and other parts for the project to build a model solar collector, and its assembly and testing.

He discussed the cost of energy obtained from solar power plants. He said: In view of the low cost of fossil fuels in the world, at first glance the cost of the energy obtained from solar power plants may appear quite high, but if we take into consideration the losses caused by air pollution and the probable costs of compensating for that, this cost will be quite insignificant.

Engineer Vahdati added: The cost of producing a kilowatt of solar power plant energy has dropped from about \$4,500 in the first units built to \$2,800 in current units. However, in view of the possibility of building most of the solar power plants inside the country, some of the foreign exchange costs will be converted to rials. On the other hand, in view of the downward trend of this cost which was mentioned, it is expected that this cost will also decline in the future.

The executive in charge of the solar power plant said the useful life of this plant is 30 years. He said: During such a period, the elimination of the annual expulsion of 160,000 tons of carbonic gas into the air will be prevented and 12 million barrels will be saved.

Merchandise Transport From Turkey Decreases

95LA0006F Tehran SALAM in Persian 7 Sep 94 p 3

[FBIS Translated Text] (IRNA)—During the first eight months of the current year the transport of goods into Iran from Turkey (11 Dey 1372-9 Shahrivar 1373 [1 December 1993-31 August 1994]) decreased compared to the same period the previous year, to 64,000 tons.

During this period 142,000 tons of transit goods were shipped to Iran from the Turkish port of Trabzon on the Black Sea.

The Anatolia News Agency issued this report on Tuesday from the port of Trabzon. Quoting officials from this report, it added: This reduction is due to the sharp drop in Iran's imports.

The same officials expressed the hope that the amount of goods bound for Iran coming into Turkish ports will

increase in the next Christian era year. It is to be noted that in the period 1980-1987 600,000 tons of goods were transported annually to Iran through the Turkish port of Trabzon. This figure was on the decline after the year 1987.

In the years 1991 and 1992 the transport of transit goods through this port to Iran increased again, and going from an annual figure of 350,000 tons to 400,000 tons.

The sharp drop in transit goods bound for Iran passing through the Turkish in the current Christian era year has brought on a severe crisis in the transportation sector in the northeastern part of Turkey.

Heart Patients Will Not Be Sent Abroad

95LA0006H Tehran KEYHAN-E HAVA'I in Persian 17 Aug 94 p 4

[FBIS Translated Text] The 140 billion rials [R] in credits needed for Tehran Medical Sciences University to build, equip, and start the Cardiovascular Research and Treatment Center will be procured by the Islamic Development Bank, the Sepah Bank, the Commercial Bank, and the National Bank.

Tehran, (KEYHAN-E HAVA'I News Service)—18 Mordad [9 August] Early in the year 1375 [21 March 1996-20 March 1997], with the opening of the Cardiovascular Research and Treatment Center, all the needs of the nation's heart patients will be met and the sending of patients abroad will be terminated.

This was announced by Dr. Seyyed Hasan 'Arefi, specialist in heart diseases and chief of the Cardiovascular Division of Tehran's Dr. Shari'ati Hospital, during a visit to the half-complete building for the Cardiovascular Research and Treatment Center.

Dr. 'Arefi said: The construction of this hospital began due to the severe shortage of heart hospitals in the country and with joint investment of the Sepah Bank, the Commercial Bank, the National Bank and Tehran Medical Sciences University.

He said: This center has more than 100 CCU and A.C.U. beds, as well as a cardiovascular diagnostic room.

According to him, in this center, in addition to the treatment of patients, this center will also have specialist and research resources for training heart specialist cadres.

He said: With the utilization of the above specialist center, which has seven operating rooms and 440 beds, no heart patients will any longer be sent abroad.

He added: This center, in addition to treating heart patients inside the country, can also provide treatment services to other heart patients in Islamic and neighbor countries.

According to the report from the newspaper KEYHAN-E HAVA'I, the credits needed to build, equip and start

up this center are expected to be R140 billion, about \$35 million of which will be in foreign exchange, the rest in rials.

The Islamic Development Bank has assumed the task of procuring \$25 million of the needed foreign exchange credits for this center to buy medical equipment.

IRNA reports that while visiting the half-complete construction work on this center, Dr. Mohammad Hoseyn 'Adeli, chief of the Central Bank, said: With the use of this center, \$6 million in foreign exchange will be saved annually.

Construction on this center began about two years on a site with an area of 17,000 square-meters and 55,000 square meters of foundation. [sentence as published]

Official on State of Forests in Gilan Province

94LA0259H Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
3 Sep 94 p 10

[FBIS Translated Text] In an exclusive interview with the news agency, Mr. Shari'atnezhad, general manager of natural resources for the province of Gilan, gave a short report on the situation in Gilan's forests and the activities carried out by the Gilan General Office of Natural Resources. We will read the results of this interview together:

Engineer Shari'atnezhad began by discussing the province's climate. He said: The climactic conditions on the Caspian littoral and in the northern foothills of the Alborz range have created valuable varieties of forests in the provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran, and a number of them are undoubtedly considered to be among the world's best varieties of forests.

He said: The forest areas of northern Iran, in view of the ecological conditions, the environment, and the ability to cultivate forests and produce wood, are considered the nation's wood production center. This centrality is completely appropriate and is an undeniable reality. According to the views of some of the nation's experts, researchers and scholars, in view of the natural resources existing in this region, it is appropriate to give land-use priority in this region to forest revitalization, forest maintenance and wood cultivation.

Continuing, Mr. Shari'atnezhad said: Many experts believe that the planting of cultivated and agricultural crops must accompany the production of wood for the purpose of increasing wood production, so we will not need to import it.

He said: If the forest in any society is a blessing and support for its advancement and development, this is not merely because of its economic benefits, but also because of the plant cover. If forests are renewed as natural resources, they provide other more important benefits and good things in the lives of the individuals in society, the most important of which are the effects on

the environment and the preservation of water and soil, and consequently the development of agriculture.

The Gilan Province general manager of natural resources discussed the importance of forest environments. He said: To understand the extent to which forests and plant cover have a direct effect on the environment, it is enough to mention the views of the participants in the International Conference of the UN Development Organization. The participants in that conference said one of the most important factors in increased environmental pollution is the destruction of trees, forests and plant cover.

He said: It is hoped that this international and important warning to protect and guard forests and pastures will be given continual attention by officials, livestock keepers, farmers, and those who live in and near the forests.

Continuing, Mr. Shari'atnezhad said: Since the province of Gilan is considered one of the most important areas for the production of wood and forest products, special attention has therefore been given in recent years and in the economic and social development plans to the forest sector and to forest products.

In the year 1372 [21 March 1993-20 March 1994] alone 16 national and province programs including 44 projects were carried out by the province's various natural resource general office units. In general, there are three main goals being pursued in the implementation of these projects: preserving forests and pastures, making proper use of them and also the development, revitalization and reconstruction of forests and pastures. It is appropriate, for public information, that I mention the most important of these activities.

The Gilan Province general manager of natural resources discussed the sapling production and forest planting sector. He said: The production of various kinds of broad-leaf and pine seedlings is being done in sapling beds in the province, and with the cooperation of the private sector, the Shafarud Forest Corporation and the forest cooperative companies, it has reached 16 million seedlings. A significant amount of these have been given at no charge or at cost to government organizations and bodies and also to farmers and rural people and have been planted over a 6,500-hectare [ha] area. In this regard, 6,000 acres of the areas planted for forest are being monitored.

Concerning forest utilization, he said: Forest utilization includes the production of 145,929 cubic meters of forest tree pollen, the production of 17,248 cubic meters of lumber, the production of 216,000 cubic meters of beams and firewood and the production of 213,000 tons of coal.

In part of this interview he discussed the pasture survey and regulation sector. He said: Among other activities completed are the survey and regulation of pastures and the preparation of pasture-keeping projects over an area

of 41,500 ha, most of whose transfer documents were given to representatives of livestock keepers in special ceremonies held during the president of the republic's visit to Gilan.

Other work completed includes the conversion of low-yield dry farm lands for the cultivation of feed, renovating pastures through the building of mounds on an area of 4,000 ha, the spreading of fertilizer on summer pastures, dividing pastures for the purpose of reviving and renovating plant cover over an area of 11,000 ha, and also the construction of 25 watering troughs to provide sanitary drinking water for livestock and pastures.

Continuing, Mr. Shari'atnezhad discussed the forest maintenance sector and the procurement of comprehensive projects in this regard. He said: The marking of 742,000 cubic meters of forest trees for the purpose of utilization and meeting the province's and the entire country's wood needs, the preparation of comprehensive forest maintenance projects on an area of 26,500 ha of the province's forests and the development of forests on 1,100 ha, are other tasks completed by the general office.

In the same regard one can also mention the surveying of lands, road construction and the construction of forest parks, which included the surveying of 165,000 ha of nationalized lands, the designation of national resources, the publication of a notice over an area of 79,067 ha, the construction of 100 km of forest roads with the cooperation of the Shafarud Company, the repair and transfer of 147 km of forest roads, and the preparation of a 95-km forest road project.

Steps were also taken in the education and promotion sector including the formation of training classes for 270 people in various occupational and specialist areas for workers, the training of more than 400 members of the forest cooperative companies on the proper procedures for utilizing and reviving forests and how to preserve and protect them, the training of more than 2,000 livestock keepers and forest dwellers in the proper procedures for pasture keeping, and familiarizing more than 4,800 students with the importance and role of forests and pastures.

Likewise, the project to centralize isolated scattered families living in the forest will locate them in a 1,830-ha area in the North Astara water basin within the territory of the Astara Forest Cooperative Company. In this region the project's implementation has been divided into three phases. In Phase I, 148 forest-dwelling families were settled with consideration for all the needed housing and welfare installations, and its continuation is being pursued rapidly and seriously.

He discussed the continued operations in the project to organize the removal of livestock in the jurisdiction of the Malekrud and Kharar forest cooperative companies, the two forest cooperative companies of Radar Poshteh and the Emamzadeh Ebrahim Forest Cooperative Company. He said: This project went into operation in the Chasham Siyahkal area in the jurisdiction of the Malekrud Forest Cooperative Company in the presence of the respected president of the republic. In this project's implementation 1,375 head of cattle were removed from 1,200 ha of forest and in their place 55 head of pure-bred cattle were given to the members of the Forest and Forest Resident Cooperative Company.

He said: Operations to build parks in the various regions of the province continued. The Saravan Forest Park was opened at the beginning of the year [21 March 1994] as the second forest park (after Emamzadeh Hashem Park). Construction is being carried out in other forest parks in the regions of Gisum Nalesh and Savabasteh Kiashahr by the workers of the Province Natural Resources Office, and it is hoped that there will be six of these forest parks in the near future.

In conclusion, Engineer Shari'atnezhad, general manager of the Gilan Province Office of Natural Resources, asked the good people of Gilan to make efforts to preserve and protect the forests, because this divine gift is for everyone, and we are also a means to maintain this national asset in a worthy manner, to use it logically and to truly revive it.

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